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ABSTRACT 
SWING VOTERS? 
ROMAN CATHOLICS FROM 1992 TO 2004
By
Lori Gula Wright 
University of New Hampshire, December, 2006
This thesis evaluates whether Catholics are swing voters, how their voting 
behavior has changed from 1992 to 2004, and what issues are influencing their 
voting behavior. National Election Survey datasets from 1992, 1996, 2000 and 
2004 are used. Two models are evaluated, the ethnoreligious model and the 
culture wars thesis. In addition, this thesis looks at whether Catholics tend to be 
single-issue voters.
The research and analysis of this thesis support the conclusion that 
Catholics are not swing voters and that their voting patterns are more similar to 
the general electorate than ever before. Although religious, class and cultural 
issues have significantly influenced Catholic voting behavior, they also have 
significantly influenced non-Catholic voting behavior in similar ways. While the 
“Catholic Vote” may once have been a significant factor in electoral politics, today 
Catholics are more likely to vote like the rest of the country than ever before.
viii
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INTRODUCTION
In the 2004 presidential election, pollsters and political pundits pointed to the 
increasingly important role of religion in influencing voting behavior, citing it as a 
key reason why Republican President George W. Bush was re-elected by a 
majority of the voters. Pollsters have found that religious commitment is a 
primary indicator of voting behavior, stronger than education, gender, or income.1 
Roman Catholics played an important part in Bush’s victory; overall, Roman 
Catholics voted 52 to 47 percent for Bush, rejecting Catholic Democrat John 
Kerry.2 Just 12 years before in 1992, however, Catholics opted for Democrat Bill 
Clinton over Republican George H.W. Bush, providing Clinton a 9-percentage 
point margin over Bush.3 In the four election cycles since 1992, the majority of 
Catholics have twice voted for a Democratic presidential candidate and twice for 
a Republican presidential candidate. These swings in support between 
Democratic and Republican presidential candidates have prompted media and 
political pundits to declare Catholics the most significant swing voters in 
American electoral politics today.4 While research on swing voters is limited, 
scholars studying these voters have found that 25 percent of Americans are 
swing voters and in close national elections, they decide who is elected
1 Denton, Robert E. Jr., “Religion and the Presidential Campaign,” American Behavioral Scientist, 
September 2005, 49:1, p. 11
2 Sabato, Larry J., Divided States of America: The Slash and Burn Politics of the 2004 
Presidential Election, Pearson Longman, 2006, p. 224.
3 Reichley, A. James, Faith in Politics, Brookings Institution Press: Washington, D.C., 2002, p.
314.
4 Breyfogle, Todd, “Some Paradoxes of Religion in the 2000 Presidential Election,” Stateside,
2001, p. 545.
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president.5 And Catholics have constituted a greater portion of swing voters since 
1980.6
Catholics appear to have moved away from their strong historical 
ethnoreligious ties to the Democratic Party. According to a study by The Pew 
Forum on Religion and Public Life, Catholics who considered themselves 
Democrats dropped from 71 percent to 44 percent between 1960 and 2004.7 
However, scholars suggest that since 1992 many denominations, including 
Catholics, have been experiencing a growing divide between traditional and 
modernist believers based on cultural issues. Known generally as the “religion 
gap,”8 scholars it has been growing substantially since 1992, fueled in large part 
by the increasingly sophisticated operations of the Religious Right and their 
messages of moral and family values.
The 2004 election may have been one of most clear examples of the 
religious divide for Catholics. While John F. Kennedy may have been too 
Catholic for the nation in 1960, pundits quipped in 2004 that John Kerry may not 
have been Catholic enough.9 Traditionalist Catholics who had previously favored 
government-run social programs now opted for private sector efforts and the
5 Shaw, Daron, “Swing Voting and U.S. Presidential Elections,” 2006, p. 23. Presented June 10, 
2006, at the Northeastern University conference, “The Swing Voter in American Politics,” Boston, 
Mass.
6 Mayer, William G., “The Swing Voter In American Presidential Elections: An Initial Inquiry,” 
2006, pp. 30-31. Presented June 10, 2006, at the Northeastern University conference, “The 
Swing Voter in American Politics,” Boston, Mass.
7 Morton, Heather, ed., “Religion and Public Life: A Faith-Based Partisan Divide,” The Pew Forum 
on Religion and Public Life, Trends 2005, p. 31.
8 Layman, Geoffrey C., The Great Divide: Religious and Cultural Conflict in American Party 
Politics, ed. Robert Y. Shapiro, Columbia University Press: New York, 2001, p. 70.
9 Sabato, Larry J., Divided States of America: The Slash and Bum Politics of the 2004 
Presidential Election, Pearson Longman, 2006, p. 224.
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social ideas of Republican candidates.10 Modernist Catholics who held more 
liberal views on cultural issues such as gay marriage and abortion rights found 
more to like about Kerry, a supporter of civil unions for gay couples and abortion 
rights. Kerry’s Catholic faith, however, was not enough to convince a substantial 
portion of conservative and centrist Catholics to vote for him.11
Yet while the majority of Catholics rejected the first President Bush and 
supported the second President Bush, it would be inaccurate to categorize 
Catholics now as majority Republican. In fact, their shift in support away from 
Democratic candidates appears to indicate that they have no political home. Are 
the pollsters and political pundits correct? Are Catholics swing voters? What are 
the issues that are impacting their voting behavior?
This study attempts to determine whether Catholics are swing voters in 
American electoral politics, and if so, how their voting behavior has changed from 
1992 to 2004.1 will assess the relationship between religion and voting behavior 
for Catholics by looking at National Election Survey data for the period from 1992 
to 2004. Traditionally, the ethnoreligious model -  ethnic, denominational and 
communal ties that strongly define a partisan alignment -  has been a strong 
predictor of voting behavior.12 This study will assess whether the ethnoreligious 
model remains a strong predictor of Catholic voting behavior, or whether there a 
new alignment has developed tied to religiosity fueled by cultural issues. Known
10 Kapp, Lawrence, “The Political Values and Voting Behavior of American Catholics: Changes 
and Continuities from 1984 to 1998,” Ph.D. Dissertation, Catholic University, 1999.
11 Sabato, Larry J., Divided States of America: The Slash and Bum Politics of the 2004 
Presidential Election, Pearson Longman, 2006, p. 224.
12 Guth, James L., Kellstedt, Lyman A., Green, John C., Smidt, Corwin E., “America Fifty/Fifty,” 
First Things: A Monthly Journal of Religion and Public Life, Issue 116, October 2001, p. 19.
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as the culture wars thesis13, this new an alignment differs from the ethnoreligious 
model because it identifies voting patterns according to a person’s level of 
commitment to his religion, regardless of denomination. Finally, this study will 
look at whether Catholics are becoming single-issue voters on such issues as 
abortion and gay rights.
I have divided this thesis in to five sections. In the first section, I will 
discuss recent voting behavior of Catholics in America, looking at the period from 
1972 to 2004.1 have chosen this period because scholars have said that the first 
indications of a culture war and a religion gap occurred in 1972 with the election 
of Republican Richard Nixon.14 In the second section, I will review what scholars 
have said about the relationship between religion and voting behavior regarding 
two primary models, the ethnoreligious model and the culture wars thesis. After 
explaining the operationalization and measurement used in this study, I will 
review my hypotheses and then present the results of my analyses to see what 
factors influenced Catholic voting behavior from 1992 to 2004. Finally, I will 
discuss my results broadly, providing insight about Catholic voting trends. I will 
use National Election Study data sets from 1992, 1996, 2000 and 2004 in my 
analyses.
13 Layman, Geoffrey C., The Great Divide: Religious and Cultural Conflict in American Party 
Politics, ed. Robert Y. Shapiro, Columbia University Press: New York, 2001, p. 68.
14 Denton, Robert E. Jr., “Religion and the Presidential Campaign," American Behavioral 
Scientist, September 2005, 49:1, p. 12.
4
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CHAPTER I
CATHOLIC VOTERS IN AMERICA
Why study the relationship between religion and voting behavior for 
American Catholics? Simply, religion is a critical element in American culture. It 
provides guidance regarding how people should relate to each other, defines 
appropriate norms of behavior, and identifies unacceptable conduct.15 A majority 
of Americans see religion as being analogous to morality, the perceived lack of 
which has been an issue that has been growing in importance for many years. 
According to Himmelfarb, “for decades Americans ... have been telling pollsters 
that the country is experiencing a ‘moral crisis,’ or at the very least, a ‘major 
moral problem,’ reflected ... in a decline of civility, respect, responsibility and 
family stability. It is this sense of moral crisis or disarray that makes Americans, 
even nonobservant ones, so solicitous of religion.”16 And as the largest 
denomination in the nation representing approximately 25 percent of Americans, 
17 Catholics play an important role in American society and even more so in 
electoral politics if they are, indeed, swing voters. Therefore, they will be the 
focus of this study.
15 Leege, David C., “Religion and Politics in Theoretical Perspective,” in Rediscovering the 
Religious Factor in American Politics, p. 8, ed. David C. Leege and Lyman A. Kellstedt, M.E 
Sharpe: New York, 1993.
16 Himmelfarb, Gertrude, “Religion in the 2000 Election,” Public Interest, Spring 2001, Issue 143.
17 Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life “Religion and Public Life: A Faith-Based Divide,”
Trends 2005, January 2005, p. 13.
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Cultural Issues Begin To Emerge
Historically Americans voted along denominational, or ethnoreligious lines, 
with Protestants voting for Republican candidates and Catholics, Jews and other 
religious minorities supporting Democratic candidates. Scholars note that these 
ethnoreligious alignments from the mid-20th century were so strong that they held 
beyond the New Deal’s class politics that pitted more affluent Americans against 
less affluent, industrial working class Americans.18 Catholic support for 
Democratic presidential candidates was consistent during the period, except 
when Catholics overwhelming backed Democratic John F. Kennedy in I960.19 
However after 1960, the Catholics’ traditionally strong support for Democratic 
candidates began to wane.20 As the country moved into the turbulent social and 
cultural period of 1960s and 1970s, and as Catholics became more educated 
and affluent, the Catholic-Protestant tensions of the 19th and 20th centuries began 
to ease. In its place were the beginnings of what many scholars say was a new 
framework for religion and voting behavior based on “conflict within religious 
traditions over belief, practice and the role of religion in society.”21 The culture 
war, both in society and within the Catholic Church, seemed to have begun.
Within the church, 1968 marked a defining moment for Catholics with the 
publication of the encyclical Humanae Vitae, in which the Vatican declared the 
use of artificial birth control a moral sin. Not only did many parishioners feel the
18 Guth, James L., Kellstedt, Lyman A., Green, John C., Smidt, Corwin E., “America Fifty/Fifty,”
First Things: A Monthly Journal of Religion and Public Life, Issue 116, October 2001, p. 19.
19 Manza, Jeff, and Brooks, Clem, “The Religious Factor in U.S. Elections, 1960-1992," The 
American Journal of Sociology, July 1997, 103:1, p. 39, p. 72.
20 Guth, et. al„ p. 20.
21 Manza and Brooks, July 1997, p. 72.
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Vatican was out of touch with the modern issues of Catholics regarding family 
planning, the encyclical came just six years after the sweeping changes 
recommended in the Second Vatican Council.22 Expectations were high among 
the laity that the church was about to change its policy on birth control, especially 
after the pope had created a papal commission in 1962 to reexamine the 
church’s policy on the issue 23 The commission’s report, released in 1967, was 
divided on the issue, with the minority opinion in line with Humanae Vitae. The 
report drew an immediate reaction from liberal theologians and the clergy, and by 
1977, 73 percent of Catholics supported the use of artificial birth control.24 “For 
the first time in American Catholic history, American Catholics publicly resisted 
an official church teaching.”25
Outside of the church, the 1972 presidential election marked a watershed 
moment in Catholic voting behavior. Republican Richard Nixon won 53 percent of 
the Catholic vote, and for the first time, Gallup reported that a majority of Catholic 
voters chose a Republican presidential candidate.26 Nixon had courted Catholic 
voters, who found comfort in Nixon’s message of support for parochial schools, 
which were facing closure across the nation because of rising costs and a 
decline in urban enrollments. Prior to the 1972 election, the White House staffer 
Ron Morey proposed cutting federal aid for parochial schools, fearing that if he 
did not, he would alienate Protestants and public school teachers. Morey
22 Carey, Patrick, Catholics in America, Praeger: Westport, CT, 2004, p. 131.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid, p. 132.
25 Ibid.
26 Prendergast, William B., The Catholic Voter in America, Georgetown University Press, 
Washington, D.C., 1999, p. 157.
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underestimated the Catholic response, which overwhelming supported aid to 
parochial schools (70 percent of Catholics polled by Gallup in 1972 favored 
aid.)27 Concern in the White House over the Catholic reactions to Morey’s 
proposal reached the highest level: the Republican Party Platform of 1972 made 
crystal clear Nixon’s support for aid to parochial schools, and Nixon himself told 
the Knights of Columbus, “In our fight to save your schools, you can count on my 
support.”28
The legalization of abortion in 1973 further impacted the relationship 
between religion and Catholic voting behavior, as well as the relationship 
between the laity and church leaders. Of all the religious traditions, Catholics 
were the most vocal opponents of Roe v. Wade, both before and immediately 
after the decision.29 Conservative lay Catholics supported their bishops who now 
publicly entered the political ring with more vigor than before with the goal to 
amend the U.S. Constitution.30 Shaken by the sweeping nature of Roe, which 
authorized abortions up to the first six months of gestation of a fetus, 
conservative Catholics “agreed with the bishops that the court’s ruling violated 
the fundamental value attached to individual human life no only by Catholicism 
but by the entire Judeo-Christian tradition, and indeed by most forms of Western 
humanism.”31 More liberal members of the clergy and the laity, however, saw the 
issue as one of women’s rights and openly disagreed with the church on the
27 Prendergast, p. 160.
28 Prendergast, pp. 160-161.
29 Martin, William, With God on Our Side: The Rise of the Religious Right in America, Bantam 
Doubleday Dell Publishing Group: New York, 1996, p 193.
30 Prendergast, p. 170.
31 Reichley, p. 274.
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issue.32 No other issue has so divided the Catholic Church as the abortion 
issue.33
Though opposed to abortion, evangelical and fundamentalist Protestants 
remained quiet relative to Catholics.34 However, that low profile would not last for 
long and would, in fact, become the impetus for the birth of the Religious Right, 
which would have a significant effect on shaping public discussions about 
morality and cultural issues important to Catholics. Concerns about the 
Protestant response to the abortion issue as well as the increasing numbers of 
abortions resulted in the creation of a five-part film and companion book, 
Whatever Happened to the Human Race? 35 The film and book had a dramatic 
impact on evangelicals and conservative Christians, and their leaders sensed an 
opportunity to draw together conservatives of all faiths, including Catholics, on a 
number of issues such as abortion, pornography, education, traditional biblical 
moral values, and quotas.
Fundamentalist leaders and secular conservatives ramped up their 
strategizing in the late 1970s.36 In 1978 when President Jimmy Carter changed 
the tax-exempt status of church-run schools requiring them to accept a certain 
percentage of students from racial minorities, the issue brought together powerful 
national evangelists such as Jerry Falwell, Pat Robertson and Jim Bakker under
32 Carey, p. 134.
33 Ibid, p. 133.
3 4 ....Ibid.
35 Martin, p 193.
36 Reichley, A. James, Faith in Politics, Brookings Institution Press: Washington, D.C., 2002, p. 
296.
9
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one organization, the Moral Majority.37 The organization sought to align people of 
all faiths under one body with the goal of “returning the United States to moral 
sanity.”38 Other conservative religious groups focused on specific issues also 
formed, and in an effort to build a cohesive voting bloc, the groups formed a 
network of like-minded leaders who served in leadership roles within each other’s 
organizations, both religious and secular. The unifying theme was a pro-family, 
traditional Judeo-Christian values plank.39 The Religious Right was born.
The Religious Rights campaigned hard for Republican Ronald Reagan in 
1980, and stood behind him again 1984, more active and effective than ever 
before.40 Reagan’s message went over particularly well with Catholics, who 
made up a substantial portion of so-called Reagan Democrats — conservative on 
moral issues and drawn to Reagan’s emphasis on traditional values and 
patriotism 41 In 1980, Reagan ran 7 percentage points ahead of his Democratic 
challenger among Catholic voters; in 1984, he increased that margin to 11 
percentage points.42 Reagan Democrats typically were blue-collar workers who 
increasingly felt alienated by the liberal stands and policies -  anti-Vietnam, 
school busing, pro-choice on abortion, higher taxes, anti-school prayer -  of the 
Democratic Party 43 For many traditionally Democratic voting blue-collar 
Catholics, the Great Communicator was someone who not only spoke to the
37 Ibid, p. 297.
38 Ibid, p. 298.
39 Wald, Kenneth D., Religion and Politics in the United States, Rowman and Littlefield 
Publishers, Oxford, England, 2003, p. 210.
40 Ibid, p. 302.
41 “Religion and Public Life: A Faith-Based Divide,” Trends 2005, The Pew Forum on Religion 
and Public Life, January 2005, p. 7.
42 Reichey, p. 281-282.
43 Page, Susan, “Reagan’s revolution reshaped political landscape,” USA Today, 7 June 2004, p. 
18a.
10
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language of the every man, but restored their faith in America as a great, God- 
given nation and supported the social teachings of the church. “Reagan staked 
out a position on the conservative side of the cultural divide on abortion, 
pornography, prayer in school, school choice and punishment of criminals.”44 
Republicans anticipated that a successful effort to draw working-class Catholic 
voters to Reagan employing morality issues could be the “Achilles’ heel of the 
liberal Democrats.”45
Indeed, in 1984 18 New England bishops said abortion was “the critical 
issue of the moment,” and Cardinal John O’Connor of New York said he couldn’t 
understand how any Catholic could vote for a candidate who was pro-choice.46 At 
the same time, more liberal Catholics were increasingly becoming concerned that 
a large portion of the flock were becoming single-issue voters on abortion, to the 
detriment of those laity who felt caught in the middle 47 Even 20 years later, 
single-issue Catholic voters on abortion still generated concern. According to 
John Langan, the Joseph Cardinal Bernardin Professor of Catholic Social 
Thought at Georgetown University, “single-issue voting may well be an admirable 
expression of conscientious conviction about an important matter, but it should 
not be imposed on voters as a requirement of conscience. Both voters and 
politicians have to make up their own minds about what issues are opportune, 
what fights can be won, what results can be achieved.”48
44 Prendergast, p. 177.
45 Reichey, pp. 280-281.
46 Prendergast, p. 189.
47 Reichley, p. 275.
48 Langan, John, “Observations on Abortion and Politics,” America, 191:12, 25 October 2005.
11
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The significance of the traditionalist-modernist disputes of the late 20th 
century should not be minimized; scholars believe it played an important part in 
restructuring the larger American religious traditions, modifying their distinct 
cultures. Voters with more traditional religious beliefs found more in common with 
other traditionalists of other denominations than they did with less traditional 
believers of their own faith.49 By the late 1980s, evidence of this restructuring 
began appearing in political polling results, and by the early 1990s, the new 
framework based on religiosity, not ethnoreligious ties, appeared to be in place.50 
Like other major denominations, Catholics experienced a realignment during this 
period, shifting their support away from Democratic candidates. “This election 
(1980) has been called the election Watergate postponed, and there are grounds 
for the belief that, along with other elements of the population, many Catholics 
returned to a track toward Republicanism on which they had been traveling for at 
least a decade.”51
1990s: “Moral Crisis” Creates “Religion Gap”
By 1992, scholars declared that a “moral crisis” in the country had created 
a “religion gap” — Americans had begun incorporating their political beliefs into 
their religious lives based on their religious commitment and activity.52 Social 
issues were seen as indicators of moral behavior becoming part of a wider 
cultural debate. The religion gap on issues of morality -  prayer in school,
49 Guth, et. al„ p. 20.
50 Green, John, C., and Guth, James L, “From Lambs to Sheep: Denominational Change and 
Political Behavior,” in Rediscovering the Religious Factor in American Politics, pp. 100-117, ed. 
David C. Leege and Lyman A. Kellstedt, M.E Sharpe: New York, 1993, p. 100.
51 Prendergasat, p. 185.
52 Layman, Geoffrey C., The Great Divide: Religious and Cultural Conflict in American Party 
Politics, ed. Robert Y. Shapiro, Columbia University Press: New York, 2001, p. 70.
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abortion, homosexuality, gay marriage -  had forced the more religiously 
observant into one corner and the more secular into another.53 According to 
Green, “Once social issues came to the forefront -  abortion, gay rights, women’s 
rights -  it generated differences based on religious attendance. The more 
observant people tend to have more traditional family values, and they moved in 
a more conservative direction because of those issues.”54
The most common measurement of the religion gap is frequency of church 
attendance. Prior to 1972 there was no religion gap, with church attendance 
having no bearing on voting behavior — church-going Americans voted in the 
same patterns as their non-church-going neighbors.55 From 1972 to 1992, the 
gap was small after Republican President Richard Nixon appealed to 
traditionalists as the “silent majority,” many of whom he considered Catholics.56 
Since 1992, however, the religion gap has continued widen, particularly in 
Clinton’s second term, and by 2004, church attendance was one of the strongest 
predictors of candidate choice.57 Also called a secular realignment, this 
restructuring “reflected the increased ideological polarization of the two major 
parties and fundamental changes in public perceptions of the parties during this 
period.”58
53 “Religion and Public Life: A Faith-Based Divide,” Trends 2005, The Pew Forum on Religion and 
Public Life, January 2005, p. 5.
54 “Churchgoing closely tied to voting patterns,” USA Today, June 3, 2004.
55 Denton, Robert E. Jr., “Religion and the Presidential Campaign,” American Behavioral 
Scientist, September 2005, 49:1, p. 12.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid, p. 26.
58 Abramowitz, Alan I., and Saunders, Kyle L., “Ideological Realignment in the U.S. Electorate,” 
The Journal of Politics, 60:3, August 1998, p. 636.
13
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As the morality battles raged, more and more Americans began identifying 
themselves as seculars. According to Hout and Fischer, from 1991 to 1998, 
adults who said in polls that they prefer no religion increased from 7 percent to 
14 percent.59 Scholars attribute this shift to a number of possible factors, 
including that polls were reflecting religious attitudes of a new generation of 
voters who were less likely to be raised in a religious tradition and were more 
liberal or moderate in their beliefs. In addition, scholars believe that the intensity 
of religious conservatives taking strong stands on issues of morality during this 
period generated a sort of religious backlash, pushing moderate and liberals into 
the secular camp. “Had religion not become so politicized, these people would 
have gone on identifying as they had been and percentage of Americans 
preferring no religion would have risen only 3 or 4 percentage points.”60
The 1992 presidential platforms of the Democratic and Republican parties 
reflected the growing religious gap, or secularization of America, by taking their 
most polarizing stands on cultural and social issues, such as abortion, gay rights 
and women’s rights. The Republican platform, in particular, heavily advocated 
traditional family and Judeo-Christian values. “It devoted considerable attention 
to cultural matters and was arguably the most morally and religiously 
conservative platform produced by a political party in this century.”61 
According to the 1992 Republican Party Platform62:
59 Hout, Michael, and Fischer, Claude S., “Why More Americans Have No Religious Preference: 
Politics and Generations,” American Sociological Review, 67, April 2002, p. 165.
60 Ibid.
61 Layman, p. 120.
62 Republican Party Platform of 1992, The Vision Shared: The Republican Platform, Uniting Our 
Family, Our Country, Our World,” 17 August 1992. Accessed online 10 March 2006 at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/showplatforms.php?platindex=R1992
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The culture of our Nation has traditionally supported those pillars on which 
civilized society is built: personal responsibility, morality, and the family. 
Today, however, these pillars are under assault. Elements within the 
media, the entertainment industry, academia, and the Democrat Party are 
waging a guerrilla war against American values. They deny personal 
responsibility, disparage traditional morality, denigrate religion, and 
promote hostility toward the family's way of life. Children, the members of 
our society most vulnerable to cultural influences, are barraged with 
violence and promiscuity, encouraging reckless and irresponsible 
behavior. This undermines the authority of parents, the ones most 
responsible for passing on to their offspring a sense of right and wrong. 
The lesson our Party draws is important—that all of us, individuals and 
corporations alike, have a responsibility to reflect the values we expect our 
fellow citizens to exhibit. And if children grow to adulthood reflecting not 
the values of their parents but the amorality with which they are 
bombarded, those who send such messages cannot duck culpability.
We also stand united with those private organizations, such as the Boy 
Scouts of America, who are defending decency in fulfillment of their own 
moral responsibilities. We reject the irresponsible position of those 
corporations that have cut off contributions to such organizations because 
of their courageous stand for family values. Moreover, we oppose efforts 
by the Democrat Party to include sexual preference as a protected 
minority receiving preferential status under civil rights statutes at the 
federal, State, and local level.
We oppose any legislation or law which legally recognizes same-sex 
marriages and allows such couples to adopt children or provide foster 
care.
In contrast, the 1992 Democratic Party Platform63 says:
We don’t have an American to waste. Democrats will continue to lead the 
fight to ensure that no Americans suffer discrimination or deprivation of 
rights on the basis of race, gender, language, national origin, religion, age, 
disability, sexual orientation, or other characteristics irrelevant to ability. 
We support the ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment; affirmative 
action; stronger protection of voting rights for racial and ethnic minorities, 
including language access to voting; and continued resistance to 
discriminatory English-only pressure groups. We will reverse the Bush 
Administration’s assault on civil rights enforcement, and instead work to 
rebuild and vigorously use machinery for civil rights enforcement; support 
comparable remedies for women; aggressively prosecute hate crimes;
63 Democratic Party Platform of 1992, “A New Covenant with the American People,” Accessed 
online 10 March 2006 at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/showplatforms.php?platindex=D1992
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strengthen legal services for the poor; deal with other nations in such a 
way that Americans of any origin do not become scapegoats or victims of 
foreign policy disputes; provide civil rights protection for gay men and 
lesbians and an end to Defense Department discrimination; respect Native 
American culture and our treaty commitments; require the United States 
Government to recognize its trustee obligations to the inhabitants of 
Hawaii generally, and to Native Hawaiians in particular; and fully enforce 
the Americans with Disability Act to enable people with disabilities to 
achieve independence and function at their highest possible level.
Democrats stand behind the right of every woman to choose, consistent 
with Roe v. Wade, regardless of ability to pay, and support a national law 
to protect that right.
It is a fundamental constitutional liberty that individual Americans—not 
government—can best take responsibility for making the most difficult and 
intensely personal decisions regarding reproduction. The goal of our 
nation must be to make abortion less necessary, not more difficult or more 
dangerous. We pledge to support contraceptive research, family planning, 
comprehensive family life education, and policies that support healthy 
childbearing and enable parents to care most effectively for their children.
For Catholics, the 1992 election “reflects a marked departure from that of 
previous presidential elections.”64 For the first time, Catholics did not vote more 
heavily for the Democratic candidate than the Republican candidate. Indeed, 
they split their votes among the top three candidates, with Independent Ross 
Perot winning 23 percent of the Catholic vote. Clinton received 41 percent of the 
Catholic vote while Bush attracted 36 percent of the vote.65 According to 
Prendergast, Catholics in 1992 were less Republican than white evangelical 
Protestants yet less Democratic than Jewish and secular voters. “They also 
evidenced a stronger propensity to behave as swing voters from one election to
64 Prendergast, p. 200.
65 Kellstedt, Green, Guth, and Smidt, “Religious Voting Blocs in the 1992 Election: The Year of 
the Evangelical?”, p. 317.
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another. Millions of voters including a substantial bloc of Catholics seemed to be 
in search of a new political home.”66
At the heart of this growing importance of religion in electoral politics was 
the rise of the Religious Right and up-tick in public debates about morality. The 
year 1992 was the culmination of more than a decade of work by religious 
leaders in America, leaders who had become sophisticated at mobilizing religious 
voters to support their views and candidates 67 Key to the rise of the Religious 
Right during this period was the 1988 failed presidential bid by Pentecostal 
Republican Pat Robertson that led Robertson to join with Ralph Reed to form the 
Christian Coalition out of the remnants of his political organization.68 By 1994, the 
Religious Right had refined its candidate-centered politics; it was recruiting 
candidates, providing them resources and mobilizing voters on their behalf.69 
According to Green, the Religious Right’s activities with nomination politics and 
involvement with the Republican Party afforded it an important benefit -  “it 
provided a forum through which to build coalitions.”70
The Christian Coalition was adept at producing compelling voter guides 
that compared candidates on specific issues. In 1996, it distributed 45 million 
copies of voter guides to 125,000 churches before the elections.71 Although 
endorsements were rare, voters had little trouble determining the coalition’s
66 Prendergast, p. 201.
67 Green, John C., “The Christian Right and the 1994 Elections, PS: Political Science and Politics, 
28:1, March 1995, p. 5.
68 Woodberry, Robert D., and Smith, Christian S., “Fundamentalism Et Al: Conservative 
Protestants in America,” Annual Review of Sociology, 24, 1998, p. 46.
69 Green, John C., March 1995, p. 6.
70 Ibid, p. 7.
71 Kohut, Andrew, Green, John C., Keeter, Scott, and Toth, Robert C., The Diminishing Divide: 
Religion’s Changing Role in American Politics, The Brookings Institution: Washington, D.C.,
2000.
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preferred candidate.72 The tactic was particularly useful for the Religious Right, 
since openly identifying as a member of the Religious Right seemed popular with 
only the most conservative fundamentalists. However, the messages of the 
Religious Right had more support with the general public.73
Although the Christian Coalition appealed largely to evangelical 
Protestants, Catholics were an important constituency for the organization and its 
ability to appeal to a broad group of religious voters. Catholics were so important, 
in fact, that the Christian Coalition held national workshops on how to court 
Catholic voters and spotlighted Catholic speakers at its annual conferences. 
National, state and local organizations put Catholics in leadership positions, and 
in 1995, the coalition founded the Catholic Alliance, in the hopes of attracting 
more Catholics to the organization.74 On some key issues, conservative 
Catholics and the Christian Right find common ground, most notably abortion, 
gay rights and restrictions on pornography; they split, however, on important 
areas for Catholics, such as aid to the poor, the death penalty, support for a 
social welfare system, protection of the environment and the teaching of 
creationism in schools.75 And even those issues on which they found common 
ground often weren’t a perfect fit for Catholics and the Christian Coalition. For 
example, on the issue of homosexuality, Catholic teachings diverge from 
evangelical Protestant beliefs. According to the Catholic Bishops, “a homosexual 
orientation is a deep-seated dimension of the personality that is not in itself
72 Ibid.
73 Woodberry, Robert D., et. al, 1998, p. 47.
74 Bendyna, Mary E., Green, John C., Rozell, Mark J., and Wilcox, Clyde, “Uneasy Alliance: 
Conservative Catholics and the Christian Right,” Sociology of Religion, 62:1, 2001, p. 52.
75 Ibid, pp. 55-59.
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sinful.”76 Homosexuals should be treated with “acceptance, love and pastoral 
care,” the bishops said, reinforcing the church’s views about respecting the 
dignity of every human being.77 In other words, Catholics are told to hate the sin 
but love the sinner, which is quite different than the evangelical Protestant beliefs 
regarding homosexuality. And while Catholics may not have been swelling the 
ranks of the Christian Coalition, conservative Catholics are generally supportive 
of the organization.78
As the morality debates nationwide continued, in 1994 Republicans laid 
out their Contract with America79 that specified certain fiscal and legal reforms. 
Although social issues were not the focus of the document, religion played a 
prominent role in the justification of the initiatives. According to the contract, “It 
can be the beginning of a Congress that respects the values and shares the faith 
of the American family” and “Like Lincoln, our first Republican president, we 
intend to act ‘with firmness in the right, as God gives us to see the right.’” During 
the mid-term elections that year, Republicans gained 53 seats in the House of 
Representatives and eight seats in the Senate, taking over Congress for the first 
time in 40 years, an event that was coined the Republican Revolution. A majority 
of Catholic voters -  52 percent -  supported Republican House candidates, an 
important factor considering some analysts consider the results of off-year 
elections a key factor in assessing voting behavior.80 Yet while these analysts
76 Ibid, p. 53.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid, p. 57.
79 Republican Contract With America. 1994. 
http://www.house.gov/house/Contract/CONTRACT.html.
80 Prendergast, p. 205.
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saw the 1994 election as evidence of a Catholic realignment with the Republican 
Party, others theorized that the results were evidence of the Catholic swing vote 
that could cast votes for Republicans just as easily as it could cast votes for 
Democrats.81
A Majority of Catholics Support Clinton’s Re-election
Catholics watched as the Clinton administration was caught up in a web of 
scandals in its first term -  former Assistant Attorney General and friend Webster 
Hubbell was in prison for defrauding his law practice; former Republican Solicitor 
General Kenneth Starr was investigating Clinton’s history with the Whitewater 
land development project; and former Arkansas state employee Paula Jones was 
pursuing charges the president had sexually harassed her.82 Clinton’s 
Republican challenger for the presidency in 1996, World War II veteran Bob 
Dole, tried to capitalize on the Clinton scandals in his election campaign, citing 
Clinton’s “character weaknesses” and the need to “restore traditional values” to 
the White House.83 However, a booming economy combined with Dole’s 
lackluster appeal and a growing distaste for Republican Party leadership (by 
1996, outspoken House Speaker Newt Gingrich was more unpopular than any 
politician since Nixon the week he left the White House84) helped propel Clinton 
to the White House for a second term in 1996 with one of the lowest voter 
turnouts in 75 years.
81 ibid.
po
Walker, Martin, “The U.S. Presidential Election, 1996,” International Affairs, 72:4, October 
1996, p. 659.
83 Ibid.
84 “Man of the Year,” Time Magazine, 25 December 1995.
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Clinton won 53 percent of the Catholic vote in 1996,16 percentage points 
ahead of Dole.85 “The years 1995 and 1996 saw an extraordinary political 
recovery by Clinton, and an epic display of political skill during the long months of 
attrition as he withstood and finally defeated the great Republican tidal wave that 
had threatened to swamp his presidency.”86 With Clinton’s strong re-election, it 
appeared that religious voters had lost their voice in American politics and 
evangelical Christians had become passive.87 Infighting had undermined the 
Christian Coalition, which dropped in one year from seventh to 35th in a fall 1999 
survey of political insiders assessing political clout.88 Yet a closer look at the vote 
indicates the increasing impact of the traditionalist-modernist disputes; a slim 
majority of traditional Catholics supported Dole (52 percent) while a majority of 
modernist Catholics backed Clinton (57 percent).89
By January 1998, however, debates about morality had taken center stage 
in American politics as news of Clinton’s affair with 21-year-old White House 
intern Monica Lewinsky and attempts to cover it up became public. The morality 
debates continued throughout the year, culminating in impeachment proceedings 
in Congress. By the November 2000 election, polls indicated that the 
repercussions of Clinton’s transgressions were having an impact on voters, 
particularly religious voters -  while a majority of voters approved of his 
performance as president, a larger majority disapproved of him as a person.90
85 Reichley, p. 316.
86 Walker, Martin, “The U.S. Presidential Election, 1996,” International Affairs, 72:4, October 
1996, p. 674.
87 Reichley, p. 332.
88 Ibid.
89 Reichley, p. 316.
90 Reichley, p. 344.
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“Disapproval of Clinton as a person sprang mainly from moral disgust, not only 
with his tawdry affair in the Oval Office with Monica Lewinsky and his subsequent 
desperate attempts at cover-up, or his perjury, but also with the entire 
atmosphere of political and ethical corruption that had settled over the White 
House during Clinton’s second term. ... The main force of this disgust came from 
anger over his violation of ethical standards rooted in Judeo-Christian moral 
tradition.”91 According to Michael Barone in U.S. News and World Report, in the 
2000 presidential election, Americans were more comfortable with religion than 
they were in the Eisenhower era, “partly because the historic hatreds between 
denominations have dissipated. But, partly in the wake of the Clinton scandals, 
many voters express a vague desire for government policies with a moral 
component.”92
Born-Again Christian President Elected
Republican George W. Bush capitalized on the religion gap in 2000 by 
portraying himself as both a born-again Christian and a moderate United 
Methodist.93 For born-again Christians, he was the answer to restoring family 
values in the White House following the sexual scandals of the Clinton 
administration; Gore was simply too closely aligned to a valueless White 
House.94 Bush also was comfortable speaking about his born-again religion 
during the presidential election; he even declared Jesus Christ as his favorite
91 Ibid.
92 Barone, Michael, “Religion on the Left, Religion on the Right,” U.S. News and World Report, 21 
August 2000, 129:7, p. 1, C-1.
93 Guth, James L., et. al., “America Fifty/Fifty.” First Things: A Monthly Journal of Religion and 
Public Life, October 2001, Issue 116, p. 22.
94 Schneider, William, "American Religion and Political Polarities,” American Sociologist, 34: 1/2, 
Spring/Summer 2003, p. 83.
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philosopher,95 much to the delight of born-again Christians and traditionalists of 
all faiths, including Catholics, as well as some moderate Christians. Moderates, 
many middle and upper class, liked Bush’s message of entrepreneurialism when 
he touted the use of faith-based programs — not government programs — to 
address social needs during the presidential election.96
The 2000 election revealed “incontrovertible evidence” that Catholics were 
polarized by the culture wars.97 Bush carried 53 percent of the Roman Catholic 
vote, but among conservative Catholics, defeated Gore by a 3-to-1 margin. 
Moderates were slightly more in favor of Bush and liberal Catholics 
overwhelmingly voted for Gore. Bush’s strategy of targeting church-going 
traditional Catholics -  voters who profess orthodox Catholic beliefs and have 
high levels of private and public religious behavior -  paid off. These beliefs 
include the dignity of all human beings, and the importance of community, which 
translates into social teachings that emphasize protection of the poor and 
marginalized; opposition to abortion, the death penalty and euthanasia; and 
opposition to homosexuality.98
The abortion issue was the church’s top priority in 200099, and its effects 
likely went beyond those Catholics who believed in total ban on abortion 
consistent with the church’s teachings. Catholics with liberal views on most other 
issues continued to vote Democratic. However, more conservative Catholics
95 Balmer, Randall, “Bush and God,” The Nation, 14 April 2003, p. 7.
96 Johnson, Jenny, “The Minister O f’Good Success’,” Christianity Today, 45:12,1 October 2001,
p. 60.
7 Guth, et. al., p. 22.
QO
Curran, Charles E., “The Pope’s Passions," Christian Century, 120:23, 15 November 2003, pp. 
29-30.
99 Reichley, A. James, Faith in Politics, Brookings Institution Press: Washington, D.C., 2002, p. 
321.
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could not rectify the opposite views of the Democratic Party and the church on 
the abortion issue, inclining them to vote for Republicans.100 According to 
scholars, “these internal divisions among Catholics are the largest ever found by 
survey research, reaching all the way back to the 1930s.”101
By 2004, religion in presidential campaigns had reached a new intensity 
with moral values being the most important consideration in the election.102 As a 
born-again Christian, Bush was comfortable talking about his faith on a regular 
basis as well as about how much he prayed. Indeed, former Secretary of State 
Madeleine Albright has said that what sets Bush apart from past presidents 
regarding his religion is his absolute certainty in his faith. “Most of our presidents 
have invoked God in some form or another. What is different about President 
Bush is that he is so certain about his religion. (He has) none of the doubts or the 
issues that President Lincoln raised. Anybody who picks a fight with us is picking 
a fight with God.”103 This openness and absolute faith went over well with 
traditionalist voters, including Catholics. Kerry, on the other hand, seemed to be 
trying to reconcile his beliefs about abortion and stem cell research with Catholic 
doctrine that opposed his stands. Kerry’s Catholic faith became such an issue 
that the church hierarchy spoke about it and one bishop warned him not to take 
communion when visiting his archdiocese.104
When the votes were counted, the majority of Catholics again voted for
101 Guth, et. al., p. 23.
102 Denton, pp. 11-12.
103 Albright, Madeleine, comments made on “The Daily Show with Jon Stewart,” 2 May 2006.
104 Denton, p. 17.
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Bush.105 Langer and Cohen hypothesize that Bush’s gains among Catholics in 
2004 were more important than his gains with evangelical Protestants; he won 
white Catholics by a 13-point margin in 2004 compared to a seven-point margin 
in 2000. And in 2004, Catholics represented 27 percent of the voters verses 
evangelical Protestants who represented 23 percent.106 In Massachusetts, a 
staunchly Democratic state and Kerry’s home state, Bush improved his support 
from Catholics by 17 percentage points over 2000, the state with the largest 
increase.107 The stunning result was in large part due to an impressive 
Republican strategy to mobilize Catholic voters and the overwhelming support 
Republicans received from former Catholic Boston Mayor Ray Flynn, the former 
ambassador to the Vatican. “The Republican National Committee set up a 
website (KerryWrongforCatholics.com), hired 30 full-time field coordinators, and 
mobilized 55,000 volunteers to help build Catholic support for Bush. Seventy-six 
million voter guides were distributed to active Catholics in 12 battleground states, 
and ads ran in prime electoral targets like Ohio, Pennsylvania, and New 
Hampshire.”108
Flynn’s effort was considered the lynchpin to Bush’s swell of Catholic 
support. Working in concert with Archbishop Sean O’Malley, Flynn found private 
funding to support a massive outreach effort to Catholics at the parish level in 
Massachusetts, as well as New Hampshire and Ohio. Parishioners shared coffee 
and donuts after Mass with Flynn, who explained why they should support Bush,
105 Green, Smidt, Guth and Kellstedt, p. 1
106 Langer, Gary, and Cohen, Jon, “Voters and Values in the 2004 Election,” Public Opinion 
Quarterly, 69:5, Special Issue 2005, p. 753
107 O’Beirne, Kate, “Catholics For Bush,” National Review, 29 November 2004, p. 24.
108 Ibid, p. 26.
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whose positions on gay marriage and abortion were consistent with Catholic 
teachings.109 After the election, Flynn told the National Review, “This was the 
perfect example of how lay Catholics should respond to the challenge of 
defending our values. It’s not the intention to make the Church or the Bishops 
more political, but to make lay Catholics more involved.”110
By August 2005, surveys indicated Americans saw Republicans as the 
protectors of religious values. Only 29 percent of those surveyed by the Pew 
Research Center for the People and the Press saw the Democrats as friendly 
toward religion while 55 percent viewed the Republicans as friendly toward 
religion.111
109 O’Beirne, p. 26.
110 Ibid.
111 The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, “Religion a Strength and Weakness 
for Both Parties,” 30 August 2005, p. 1
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
Much has been said about changes in the relationship between politics 
and voting behavior for Catholics in the last 30 years. Once a staunchly loyal 
Democratic voting bloc, Catholics today appear to be shifting in voting behavior. 
Some say Catholics, whose immigrant ties have weakened as they have become 
more affluent and educated, are becoming more conservative. Others point to a 
culture war based on morality and values issues that is as appealing to traditional 
Catholics as it is unappealing to liberal Catholics, but which is aligning Catholics 
with those of other denominations who hold similar views. These changes in 
Catholic voting behavior have lead scholars to deem Catholics as the new swing 
voters -  a denomination that, as a whole, is without a political homeland.
Scholars generally have relied on two primary models for assessing 
changes in the relationship between religion and voting behavior: the 
ethnoreligious model and the culture wars thesis. The ethnoreligious model looks 
at shifts in voting behavior based on traditional denominational-political 
alignments. Developed in the late 20th century, the culture wars thesis assesses 
the relationship by evaluating religious commitment. In this section, I will discuss 
these models, and assess their strengths and weaknesses relative to Catholic 
voting behavior.
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The Ethnoreligious Model
For centuries, American voting has been shaped by ethnoreligious 
loyalties. These loyalties tie religious denominations to specific class, ethnic, 
cultural and community identities that are critical in determining partisan ties for 
its members.112 Developed by historians and used by political scientists, the 
ethnoreligious model relies primarily on religious belonging -  the effects of 
religious tradition and not the effects of religious beliefs or behaviors -  to 
“produce distinctive group identification and distinctive cultural and political 
values.” 113 What matters in the ethnoreligious model are the differences 
between, not within, religious traditions.114
Kellstedt and Green acknowledge that other factors, such as religious 
commitment (which is the cornerstone of the culture wars thesis) and the social 
environment of the voter, influence voting behavior and may provide insight in 
assessing religion and voting behavior. However, they maintain that the core 
influencer on voting behavior is denominational choice -  other factors simply 
enhance it.115 “Denominational preference matters in politics because 
denominations are important: they are central to religious life, objects of deeply 
held commitments, and together with their component institutions, the most 
common form of voluntary association in the United States Denominations are 
characterized by all of the processes that create and maintain group
112 Guth.et. al., p. 19.
113 Layman, Geoffrey C., The Great Divide: Religious and Cultural Conflict in American Party 
Politics, ed. Robert Y. Shapiro, Columbia University Press: New York, 2001, p. 64.
114 Ibid.
115 Kellstedt, Lyman A., and Green, John C., “Knowing God’s Many People: Denominational 
Preference and Political Behavior,” in Rediscovering the Religious Factor in American Politics, pp. 
54-55, ed. David C. Leege and Lyman A. Kellstedt, M.E Sharpe: New York, 1993.
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identification, and the core of such identification is attachment to broader culture 
traditions.”116
In the United States scholars generally recognize six major 
denominational families: white mainline Protestants, white evangelical 
Protestants, black Protestants, Roman Catholics, Jews, and 
nonreligious/secular117. A denominational affiliation is so significant important that 
“more than four-fifths of American adults routinely express a denominational 
preference of one kind or another -  more, in fact, than identity with a political 
party.”118 The ethnoreligious-political alignments have historically been quite 
stable: Mainline Protestants voted for the Whig and then Republican candidates, 
and evangelical Protestants, Catholics, secularists, Jews and black Protestants 
supported Democratic candidates.119
The traditional ethnoreligious loyalties of Catholics have been aligned 
solidly with Democratic candidates since the mid-1800s when the pro­
temperance Whig Party, and then the Republican Party, had a collation with the 
major Protestant churches.120 “The Democrats aggressively courted the new 
immigrants and made a generous immigration policy a cornerstone of their party 
platforms.”121 Considered a decisive factor in presidential elections, the “Catholic 
Vote” was so important to politicians that Democrats often attributed their wins to 
Catholics. Indeed, New Hampshire’s only native son to hold the presidency,
116 Ibid, p. 65.
117 Ibid, p. 54.
118 Ibid.
119 Ibid, p. 56.
120 Kellstedt, Lyman A., Green, John C., Guth, James L., and Smidt, Corwin, E., “It’s the Culture 
Stupid! 1992 and Our Political Future,” First Things, 42, April 1994, p. 29.
121 Kapp, p. 18
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Democratic President Franklin Pierce, won the election because of the “foreign 
vote and the Catholic influence” in 1852.122 The anti-Catholic, anti-immigrant 
rhetoric of the Republican Party at the time helped unite groups of ethnically 
diverse populations of new Americans: poor and uneducated Irish, Germans, 
Italians, Poles, and other ethnic groups from eastern and southern Europe. “No 
other religious group in the United States holds within its ranks so varied a 
mixture of ethnic strains as the Catholic Church.”123
By the turn of the century, the population of Catholics had increased 85 
percent from 9 to 16 million from 1890 to 1910. In comparison, the population of 
the United States increased 50 percent.124 The first wave of immigrants from the 
1840s and 1850s were having children and grandchildren who were being 
educated in the rapidly growing network of parochial schools, further unifying 
Catholics as a community.125 Catholic involvement in national politics escalated 
as the country moved into the 1920s, and for many Catholics, the bitter 1928 
presidential election in which anti-Catholic venom by Republicans and their 
supporters reached new heights would have a lasting effect benefiting 
Democratic candidates. New Catholic voters turned out in overwhelming 
numbers in support of Catholic Democrat and anti-Prohibition candidate Al Smith, 
and their newfound heavy involvement in national politics that year would have a 
lasting effect in following years: Franklin D. Roosevelt would be elected to the
Prendergast, p. 85.
123 Prendergast, p. 5.
124 Prendergast, p. 71.
125 Ibid, p. 72.
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first of four terms in 1932 with unwavering Catholic support.126 “The most 
significant result of the 1928 election...was not the Republican gains in the 
South, which proved to be ephemeral, but the mobilization of Catholic voters in 
northern cities, which would help produce a new Democratic majority in the 
1930s.”127
The election of Roosevelt brought the New Deal years, for the first time, 
Catholics found themselves in powerful positions at the national level. Twenty- 
five percent of federal judge positions were filled by Catholics during the 
Roosevelt years, compared to just 4 percent in the previous three Republican 
administrations.128 Roosevelt courted clergy at the highest levels of the Catholic 
Church, so much so that many of the ideas of the New Deal seemed to come 
straight from the social and economic teachings of the church. “A document 
issued in 1919 entitled the ‘Bishops’ Program for Social Reconstruction’ 
foreshadowed certain elements of the program of the Roosevelt administration, 
including legislation establishing a minimum wage, insurance protected the aged 
and the unemployed, and recognition of labor’s right to organize.”129
The 1950s saw the return of Republicans in the White House. Although 
the overwhelming majority of Catholics still identified as Democrats in the 1950s, 
the Korean War, communist fears and corruption in the previous Democratic 
administration began to erode the strong ethnoreligious ties of the Catholics to
Ibid, p. 111.
127 Reichley, pp. 210-211.
128 Prendergast, p. 113.
129 Ibid.
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the Democratic Party.130 The anti-Communist stance of Republican Dwight D. 
Eisenhower had particular resonance with Catholics. Efforts by eastern European 
countries to suppress the Catholic Church did not set well with immigrants who 
shared ethnic ties with their oppressed brethren. In addition, for decades the 
Pope and church hierarchy had regularly warned about the threat of 
Communism.131
However, any erosion of the ethnoreligous ties to the Democrats was 
turned on its face in 1960 with the election of the first Catholic president, John F. 
Kennedy. Like Democrat Al Smith of 1928, Kennedy was faced with the same 
questions about dual allegiances -  allegiance to the pope and Catholic Church, 
or allegiance to the American democracy. However unlike Smith, Kennedy was 
able to effectively answer “the Catholic question.” To those trying to make hay 
out of his loyalties, his famous response made before the Greater Houston 
Ministerial Association was this: “I am not the Catholic candidate for president. I 
am the Democratic Party's candidate for president, who happens also to be a 
Catholic. I do not speak for my church on public matters, and the church does not 
speak for me."132 Still, religion was the strongest single factor in the election, 
with 78 percent of Catholics voting for Kennedy, compared to 38 percent of 
Protestants.133
130 Ibid, p. 123.
131 Ibid, p. 125.
132 "On Church and State: Remarks of John F. Kennedy Addressed to the Greater Houston 
Ministerial Association," 363-76, in The Kennedy Reader, ed. Jay David, The Bobbs-Merrill 
Company, Inc., Indianapolis, Indiana, 1967, p. 366.
133 Prendergast, p. 143.
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It appeared in 1960 that JFK had halted the erosion of the Catholic- 
Democratic Party alliance. However, Vietnam and cultural issues about abortion, 
women’s rights and civil rights soon would surface in the 1960s and 1970s, 
redefining how Americans thought about religion. New organizations such as the 
conservative Moral Majority would surface to exploit these cultural rifts, and by 
1980, it would become apparent that many Catholics were finding their traditional 
ties to Democratic candidates had become increasingly uncomfortable. Born out 
of this late 20,h century cultural upheaval would be a new way of looking at the 
relationship between politics and voting behavior -  the culture wars thesis. Also 
called the secularization of America, the culture wars thesis holds that those who 
are more religious tend to vote for more conservative candidates (Republicans) 
and those who are less religious tend to support candidates with more liberal 
views (Democrats). I will discuss the culture wars thesis in more depth in the next 
section.
However, before I conclude the discussion of the ethnoreligious model, it’s 
important to note that for Catholics, ethnoreligious factors are strongly tied to 
economic and job-related issues common in class politics: minimum wage, health 
care, unionization. The ethnoreligious model holds that any political realignments 
of the major denominational families reflect demographic, political and religious 
change -  that religious traditions are not static. Not only do old traditions vary 
and evolve, but new ones are born.134According to Layman, the ethnoreligious 
model works well explaining the historical and political differences between these
134 Kellstedt and Green, p. 56.
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traditions, and even works well with explaining more recent trends in voting 
behavior among members of denominational families.135
However, some scholars hypothesize that the recent denominational shifts 
in voting behavior are due less to denominational realignments than to religiosity 
(also called saliency) -  the importance of religion to someone or the strength of 
their religious commitment.136 And according to Layman, these shifts based on 
religiosity -  not religious traditions -  have led some scholars to consider the 
ethnoreligious model outdated.137
A critical look at the ethnoreligious model reveals that it may have become 
a less effective assessment of the relationship between religion and voting 
behavior for Catholics. It focuses only on denominational shifts, not inter­
denominational shifts, which are becoming increasingly relevant to understanding 
politics in the context of religion. For example, scholars point out that Catholics 
have increasing shifted from voting Democrat to Republican, but by looking at 
Catholics as a whole using the ethnoreligious model, shifts in voting behavior 
among Catholics with differing levels of religious orthodoxy are not evident. 
Woodbury and Smith note that most surveys used the limited and broad 
categories to assess denominational affiliation: Protestant, Roman Catholic, 
Jewish, or other. Even surveys that provide for a more detailed affiliation 
description, such as breaking Protestant down by Lutheran, Baptist,
135 Layman, Geoffrey C., The Great Divide: Religious and Cultural Conflict in American Party 
Politics, ed. Robert Y. Shapiro, Columbia University Press: New York, 2001, p. 65
136 Guth, James L., and Green, John, C., “Salience: The Core Concept?,” in Rediscovering the 
Religious Factor in American Politics, pp. 157-158, ed. David C. Leege and Lyman A. Kellstedt,
M.E Sharpe: New York, 1993.
137 Layman, 2001, p. 66.
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Presbyterian, are problematic because they do not address distinctions of the 
conservative, centrist and modern elements of these religious denominations. 
“When respondents say they are ‘Lutheran’ or “Presbyterian,’ researchers need 
to ask, ‘Which kind?”’ 138An increasing body of scholarly research indicates that 
inter-denominational shifts based on religious orthodoxy are creating new 
alignments of voters.
In addition, the ethnoreligious model may not effectively reflect changes in 
the class and communal bonds that have occurred in the last 20 to 30 years. 
Communities of largely poor, uneducated immigrants and ethnic groups, such as 
Catholics, have been disappearing as newcomers of different backgrounds move 
to these areas. Today’s more mobile society has resulted in a decrease in 
communal involvement, as evidenced by declines in church attendance and 
community organization memberships. Churches once were the center of a 
community binding like-minded people together.
According to scholars, since the 1960s, the nation has been losing “social 
capital -  the everyday social and organizational connections that nurture citizens’ 
values, define their interests, and connect them to public affairs.” 139 According to 
Putnam, weekly church attendance has dropped from 48 percent in the 1950s to 
41 percent in the 1970s, with it stagnating or dropping even further after the 
1970s.140 Union membership has been in steep decline for four decades, and 
involvement in Parent Teacher Associations has plummeted from 12 million in
138 Woodberry, Robert D., and Smith, Christian S., “Fundamentalism Et Al: Conservative 
Protestants in America,” Annual Review of Sociology, 24, 1998, p. 34.
139 Guth, et. al., October 2001, p. 20.
140 Putnam, Robert, “Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital,” Journal of Democracy, 
6:1, January 1995, p. 69.
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1964 to 7 million in the mid-1990s.141 Dramatic declines also have been seen in 
membership with civic organizations such as the Boy Scouts (down 26 percent 
since 1970), and the League of Women Voters (down 42 percent since 1969).142 
Fraternal organizations also have not been immune to the declines in 
membership. “Membership is down significantly in such groups as the Lions (off 
12 percent since 1983), the Elks (off 18 percent since 1979), the Shriners (off 27 
percent since 1979), the Jaycees (off 44 percent since 1979), and the Masons 
(down 39 percent since 1959). In sum, after expanding steadily throughout most 
of this century, many major civic organizations have experienced a sudden, 
substantial, and nearly simultaneous decline in membership over the last decade 
or two.”143
Furthermore, some scholars have noted that in the last few decades, the 
United States has seen a decline in the strength of class as an influencer of 
voting.144 This decline in class voting may be due to the growing influence of 
cultural issues on voting behavior.
Using denominational affiliation as a predictor of voting behavior was 
logical when Americans were more communal and denominations were more 
clearly defined by social stratification. However, as more people have become 
detached from communities and as issues of class have eased, the use of 
denomination affiliation -  upon which the ethnoreligious model relies -  as a 
predictor of voting behavior appears to have weakened. The strength of the
141 Putnam, p. 69.
142 Ibid.
143 Ibid.
144 Weakliem, David L., “Race versus Class? Racial Composition and Class Voting, 1936-1992,” 
Social Forces, 75:3, March 1997, p. 939.
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ethnoreligious model lies in its long-term stability reinforced by community and 
cultural bonds. However, the mobility of Americans today coupled with their 
diminished ties to their communities and traditional culture, as well as their 
growing affluence and educational levels, may be weakening the impact of the 
ethnoreligious model as a predictor of voting behavior. Americans have adapted 
their relationship between religion and politics to a more mobile system, one that 
relies little on where they live and where they came from.
The Culture Wars Thesis
Beginning in the 1990s, scholars note the emergence of a new 
relationship between religion and voting behavior based on levels of religious 
orthodoxy within denominations. Known as the culture war thesis, this new 
realignment differs from the ethnoreligious model because it is based on the idea 
that there is a growing divide between people who are more religious and people 
who are less religious, regardless of denomination. Fueling the divide between 
traditionalists (people with more orthodox beliefs who are highly engaged in 
religious worship) and those with more centrist and modern religious views are 
cultural and social issues. According to Layman, “cultural issues such as abortion 
and homosexual rights are central to the culture war thesis.”145 Instead of voting 
based on religious belonging and religious tradition, voters were aligning 
according to their level of religiosity, most often measured by how often they 
attend church.
According to Bolce and De Maio, 1992 was a “critical demarcation point” 
for the relationship between religion and voting behavior because concerns about
145 Layman, 2001, p. 68.
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cultural and social issues aligned previously antagonistic denominational factions 
into this new framework, which included an acceptance of Christian 
fundamentalism.146 Voters who were more religious -  regardless of denomination 
or denominational family -  now found themselves with more in common than with 
believers within their denomination who were more centrist and modernist. By 
2004, traditionalists and centrists had switched from Democrat to Republican, 
and modernists had reversed course, voting Democrat in 2004 after voting 
Republican in 2000.147
In the culture wars thesis, traditionalists tend to vote Republican.148 
“Traditionalists of all sorts tend to regard religion as more central to their lives 
than other groups, and perhaps not surprisingly, they report greater relevance to 
their political thinking.”149 Moderate believers, characterized by heterodox beliefs 
and lower religious engagement, are more likely to vote Democrat, regardless of 
denomination. Centrists are neither traditionalists nor modernists, and practice a 
mix of orthodox and heterodox beliefs with moderate levels of religious 
engagement. “Most centrists were willing to adapt their traditions in a changing 
world.”150
Layman’s research about presidential vote and partisan identification from 
1980 to 1994 indicates that even in 1980 there was evidence of a growing
146 Bolce, Louis, and De Maio, Gerald, “Religious Outlook, Culture War Politics, and Antipathy 
Toward Christian Fundamentalists,” Public Opinion Quarterly, 63,1999, p. 52.
147 Green, John, C., et. al., “The American Religious Landscape and the 2004 Presidential Vote: 
Increased Polarization,” The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, 3 February 2005, p. 14.
148 Green, John C., “The American Religious Landscape and Political Attitudes: A Baseline for 
2004,” The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, based on the Fourth National Survey of 
Religion and Politics, Bliss Institute, University of Akron, March-May 2004, p. 16
149 Ibid.
150 Ibid, p. 4.
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relationship between religious orthodoxy and voting behavior.151 He concludes 
that the growing effect of religious orthodoxy on voting behavior was the “most 
noticeable change in the impact of religion on American political behavior” over 
the period. Supporting Layman’s theory, Kellstedt and his colleagues determined 
that religious orthodoxy was the second strongest predictor of votes for Bush in 
1 9 9 2  1 5 2  However, they remark that 1992 could easily have been considered the 
Year of the Evangelical or the Year of the Secular since “the new role of 
evangelicals and seculars as the cultural cores of the Republican and 
Democratic parties, respectively, puts them in key positions to shape the 
ideological contours of those parties.”153 And as evangelicals and seculars had 
moved squarely to their corners of the ring, Catholics had moved into the center 
as swing voters.154 By 1994, the differences in voting behavior based on religious 
Orthodoxy rivaled past ethnoreligious differences between Jews, Catholics, and 
mainline Protestants.155
As America moved through the mid-1990s, Layman and Carmines note 
that not only was religious traditionalism becoming more relevant in society, it 
was playing “a larger role in shaping the cultural conflict in the nation’s
131 Layman, 1997, p. 298.
152 Layman, Geoffrey C., and Carmines, Edward G., “Cultural Conflict in American Politics: 
Religious Traditionalism, Postmaterialism, and U.S. Political Behavior,” The Journal of Politics, 
59:3, August 1997, p. 767.
153 Kellstedt, Lyman A., Green, John C., Guth, James L., and Smidt, Corwin E., “Religious Voting 
Blocs in the 1992 Election: the year of the Evangelical?”, Sociology of Religion, 55:3, 1994, p. 
323
154 Ibid, p. 324.
155 Layman, Geoffrey C., “Religion and Political Behavior in the United States: The Impact of 
Beliefs, Affiliations, and Commitment From 1980 to 1994,” Public Opinion Quarterly, 61, 1997, p. 
306.
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politics.”156 By 2000, the culture war thesis seemed even more relevant as the 
morality issues from the Clinton Administration and culture clashes cast shadows 
over the election. “The outcome revealed the consolidation of a new religious 
order in American politics, an altered relationship between faith and public 
affairs.”157
One of the most recent public examples of the culture wars thesis 
occurred in the summer of 2004, when the nation was transfixed by the climax of 
the year-long battle in Massachusetts to become the first state in the nation to 
legalize same-sex marriage. Combined with similar efforts in San Francisco and 
New York, the gay rights and same-sex marriage debate was one of the most 
prominent cultural discussions in the period before the November 2004 
presidential election. That election year, 11 states considered ballot initiatives 
regarding a ban on same-sex marriage and in every state, the ban prevailed, 
sometimes with large majorities of voter support.158 “Oregon represented gay- 
rights groups’ best hope for victory, but an amendment banning same-sex 
marriage prevailed there with 57 percent of the votes, leaving some activists in 
tears. Similar bans won by larger margins in Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, 
Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Ohio and Utah. More 
than 20 million Americans voted on the measures, which triumphed overall by a 
2-to-1 ratio. In the four Southern states, the amendments received at least three-
156 Layman and Carmines, p. 767.
157 Guth, et, al., October 2001, p. 19.
158 2004 Election Results, http://www.cnn.com/ELECTIQN/2004/Daqes/results/ballot.measures/. 
accessed 12 January 2006.
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quarters of the votes, including 86 percent in Mississippi; the closest outcome 
besides Oregon was in Michigan, where the ban got 59 percent.”159
Some analysts said prior to the election that support for gay marriage or 
civil unions could be a “wedge” issue that separates moderate voters, including 
moderate Catholics, from Democratic candidates the way school busing and 
welfare reform once did.160 In fact, in November 2003 Pew found that not only 
were the number of Americans who oppose gay marriage on the rise, a majority 
of Americans opposed civil unions and similar legal agreements.161 “Moreover, 
despite the overall rise in tolerance toward gays since the 1980s, many 
Americans remain highly critical of homosexuals and religious belief is a major 
factor in these attitudes. Religiosity is clearly a factor in the recent rise in 
opposition to gay marriage162. Overall, nearly six-in-ten Americans (59 percent) 
oppose gay marriage, up from 53 percent in July. But those with a high level of 
religious commitment now oppose gay marriage by more than six-to-one (80 
percent-12 percent), a significant shift since July (71 percent-21 percent). The 
public is somewhat more supportive of legal agreements for gays that provide 
many of the same benefits of marriage; still, a 51 percent majority also opposes 
this step.”163
In addition, according to Guth and his colleagues, those actively and 
aggressively involved in the culture wars have taken advantage of the decline in
159 “Voters pass all 11 bans on gay marriage,” The Associated Press, 3 November 2004. 
Accessed online at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6383353/.
160 Stone, Andrea, “Gay marriage looms large for ’04,” USA Today, 19 November 2003.
161 “Religious Beliefs Underpin Opposition To Homosexuality,” the Pew Research Center for the 




Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
memberships in social organizations previously discussed. “On one side, 
traditionalists lamented the erosion of family life, religious institutions, and 
traditional values caused not only by impersonal social developments but also by 
the conscious assaults of modernists. For their part, modernists attacked 
traditional institutions in the hope of building broader and more inclusive 
communities. Indeed, modernists -  and their secular allies -  were often as 
disturbed by decaying civic life as the traditionalists, but preferred to envision 
new institutions, not resuscitate old ones.”164
The new realignment according to religious orthodoxy has been so 
significant that, as previously discussed, groups of conservative Christians such 
as the Christians Coalition have tried to capitalize on it regarding conservative 
Catholics. Seculars, too, have tried to capitalize on the new alignment with efforts 
to “reform” religious traditions to make them more relevant to a secular society. 
“The flags of denominational or religious affiliation, it would appear, are 
increasingly less distracting in American national politics. In the absence of this 
distraction, candidates, voters and elected officials alike are in a better position to 
focus on more fundamental, underlying issues.”165
While there is strong evidence to support the culture wars thesis as the new 
realignment in how Americans tie religion to politics, I believe its fundamental 
weakness may lie in the reliance on fluid cultural issues. In years that morality 
issues are at the forefront, it may be a strong predictor of voting behavior based 
on religiosity. But in years when fiscal, security and other nonmorality issues that
164 Guth, James L., et. a!., October 2001, p. 20.
165 Breyfogle, pp. 546-547.
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are on the minds of Americans, it may weaken as a predictor of voting behavior.
In addition, cultural issues are not static. The concerns of Americans in the 1950s 
are different than the concerns of Americans in 2006. As Americans modify their 
views on cultural matters, old alignments that clearly pit traditionalists vs. 
modernists may shift, and the culture wars thesis may become less useful as a 
predictor of voting behavior.
For analyzing Catholic voting behavior, the culture wars thesis may be a 
weak indicator of the nonmorality issues that are so critical to the faith, 
particularly those about social and economic justice. Aid to the poor is a long­
standing aspect of Catholic social teachings, and concern for the environment is 
increasingly becoming a central part of it. By looking at just morality issues, the 
culture wars thesis misses highly significant aspects of what it means to be 
Catholic and why Catholics may support certain candidates.
Questioning the Ethnoreligious Model 
While denominational affiliations historically have been shown to be strong 
predictors of voting behavior, scholars note other factors that must be taken into 
consideration in order for the model to be reliable. Specifically, changes in voter 
turnout must be accounted for when measuring the impact of the ethnoreligious 
model on voting behavior. In addition, while voters may experience shifts in 
attitudes about specific issues, the denominations to which they subscribe have 
remained relatively stable from an ideological standpoint for decades.
The ethnoreligious model can be problematic from a measurement 
standpoint, particularly when research lacks an assessment of the impact of
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changes in the level of voter turnout.166 Pollster Andrew Kohut believes the role 
of religion regarding voting behavior in the 2004 election was overstated. Overall, 
voter participation increased, and the participation rate among evangelical 
Protestants was on par with those of other denominations. It was turnout and a 
“leadership gap,” not religion, which was the deciding factor for Bush.167 
According to Kohut, voters became increasingly less comfortable with Kerry’s 
leadership abilities as election day neared. After the Bush campaign saw that 
moderate and liberal Republicans were less comfortable with their choices for 
president in 2004 than in 2000, the Republicans “turned the election into a 
referendum — from a referendum on Bush to a referendum on Kerry, starting 
with the Swift Boat controversy and culminating in the convention, and it 
remained that throughout the election. The debates almost turned it around for 
Kerry but in the end, people could not get comfortable with him on the leadership 
dimension.”168
In their study spanning three decades, Brooks and Manza noted that from 
1972 to 2000, Catholics experienced little change, representing about 26 percent 
of voters.169 When considering changes in the size of religious groups, partisan 
identification and voting behavior, Brooks and Manza conclude that Catholics 
have not experienced a conservative group-specific shift in voting behavior, but
166 Brooks and Manza, p. 427.
167 Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, “How the Faithful Voted: Political Alignments & the 
Religious Divide in Election 2004,” 17 November 2004. Accessed 28 January 2006, 
http://pewforum.org/events/index.php?EventlD=64.
168 Ibid.
169 Brooks and Manza, p. 440.
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have shifted in partisan identification from a liberal, strong identification with the 
Democratic Party to an independent orientation.170
Bolzendahl and Brooks assessed denominational shifts by looking at 
attitudes about gender, abortion and sexuality since the 1970s. They found that 
denominational groups have experienced shifts related to their attitudes about 
these subjects, but that the ideological position of these religious denominations 
in relation to each other on these issues has been stable since the 1970s.171 In 
fact, instead of finding that religious groups are becoming more polarized on 
issues, which supports the theory of a growing religion gap, Bolzendahl and 
Brooks find that instances of a perceived religion gap on specific issues occur 
during a period of relative stability of denominational shifts.172 “While there is little 
reason to believe religious group memberships are tied to a decline or sweeping 
polarization in attitudes, our results do attest to the historical persistence of 
denominational influence and the strength of that influence. An examination of 
group-based differences suggests the nontrivial (and in some cases quite large) 
magnitude of religious group differences in attitudes toward gender, abortion and 
sexuality.”173
Questioning the Culture Wars Thesis
Scholars also have questioned the validity of research that pits 
traditionalists of all faiths in opposition with centrists and modernists. “There are
1'u Ibid, p. 442.
171 Bolzendahl, Catherine, and Brooks, Clem, “Polarization, Secularization or Differences as 
Usual? The Denominational Cleavages in U.S. Social Attitudes since the 1970s,” The 
Sociological Quarterly, 46, 2005, p. 72.
172 Ibid, p. 68.
173 Ibid, p. 72.
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conflicts between the more and less religious members of religious traditions on 
contentious issues such as abortion. But...religious groups do not line up 
predictably across each and every political issue.”174 Brooks and Manza 
conclude that evidence of a religion gap or culture war in American politics tied to 
religion is weak. “Our estimates of the overall religious cleavage in vote choice 
show no increase (and a modest decrease) over time. To date...the ideas of a 
‘culture war’ (or more simply, growing religious-based electoral differences) offers 
limited analytical leverage to understand the political effects of religious group 
memberships.”175
Other scholars say that the most common measurement tool used to 
evaluate levels of religiosity in the culture war thesis -  church attendance -  is 
insufficient. Many researchers use only one measure of religiosity -  church 
attendance. However, Woodberry and Smith conclude that looking at church 
attendance alone does not reflect the multiple dimensions of religious orthodoxy. 
“This assumes that religiosity is generic, that it does not matter what people 
believe or what the social context of their worship is. However, sometimes 
denomination strongly influences the impact of church attendance. Why people 
attend is also important.”176 According to Gorsuch, people attend church for a 
number of reasons, including personal, religious and social reasons, and their 
values and societal beliefs differ depending on why they attend church.177
1,4 Wald, p. 174.
175 Brooks and Manza, p. 442
176 Woodberry and Smith, p. 38.
177 Gorsuch, Richard L., “Psychology of Religion,” Annual Review of Psychology, 38, 1988, p. 
212.
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CHAPTER III
OPERATIONALIZATION, MEASUREMENT AND HYPOTHESES
Before I discuss whether Catholics are the new swing voter and what 
factors are influencing them, the first question that must be answer is, who are 
swing voters? Despite claims by pollsters and reporters about who is a swing 
voter, they rarely explain who these voters are and scholars largely have ignored 
the concept of defining and measuring swing voters. However, Mayer attempts to 
not only define who a swing voter is -  someone who is not committed either way 
and who holds no allegiances to any candidate -  but also provide a method to 
measure swing voter behavior.178
I will employ the method developed by Mayer that uses survey responses 
to NES pre-election survey feeling thermometers to devise a swing voter scale. 
Respondents are asked to indicate how favorably or unfavorably they view each 
presidential candidates by rating them on a feeling thermometer that runs from 0 
to 100 degrees. The scale used is constructed by subtracting the rating for the 
Democratic presidential candidate from the Republican candidate; higher scale 
scores indicate greater Republicanism. According to Mayer, “one advantage of 
using a scale of this sort is that it provides a nuanced, graduated measure of a
178 Mayer, p. 3.
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voter's convertability or ‘swingness.’”179 Voters with a score between -15 and 
+15 are considered swing voters, and everyone else is considered a non-swing 
voter (either a core Democrat with a score between -100 and -16, or a core 
Republican with a score between 16 and 100). After defining swing voters, I will 
look at whether Catholics are more likely to be classified as swing voters than 
non-Catholics. Following this analysis, I will evaluate Catholics using the two 
models previously discussed: ethnoreligious model and the culture wars thesis.
For the ethnoreligious model, I will look at the similarities and differences 
between Catholic and non-Catholic voting trends. If Catholic voting behavior is 
trending similar to non-Catholic voting behavior, one could argue that the 
ethnoreligious model is a weak predictor of denominational voting behavior. In 
addition, as previously noted, some scholars say that as Catholics have become 
more educated and affluent, which are both indicators of class, their voting 
behavior has shifted toward the Republican Party. One could argue that changes 
in the educational levels and economic status of Catholics are a refinement of the 
ethnoreligious model, which has a strong economic component. To account for 
these two possible influences of voting behavior, I will also include independent 
variables that measure education level and income level, and evaluate whether 
Catholics are trending in similar ways to non-Catholics regarding voting behavior, 
and changes in education and income. Also, much has been said about the blue 
state-red state divide in America, with Northeastern and Western states voting for
179 Ibid, p. 7.
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Democratic candidates (blue) and Southern and North Central states backing 
Republican candidates (red). My analysis will include an assessment of Catholic 
voting behavior by region to see if these regional characteristics are impacting 
Catholic voting behavior. Finally, Hispanics are the fastest growing minority in the 
United States, and the vast majority are Catholics. My analysis of the 
ethnoreligious model will include an assessment of Hispanic Catholics and 
whether their voting behavior differs from that of white Catholics.
For the culture wars thesis, I will measure whether there is a strong 
relationship between church attendance and voting behavior. I will also compare 
Catholic and non-Catholic voting behavior by looking at church attendance. 
Denton’s research shows that church attendance -  the most common measure 
of religiosity -  and not religious affiliation, was a more accurate predictor of 
voting tendencies in 2004. He cites National Exit Poll results showing that those 
who attend religious services from few times a month to more than once a week 
tended to vote for Bush. Kerry tended to garner votes from those who attend 
services a few times a year or not at all.180 Like Green, Denton targets 
traditionalists as those voting Republican, and modernists -  in particular, 
secularists -  voting Democrat.181 Djupe also emphasizes the importance of 
church attendance, arguing that religious orthodoxy as measured by church
180 Denton, p. 24.
181 Ibid, p. 27.
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attendance generates religious brand loyalty, which is a significant predictor of 
voting behavior.182
Finally, I will look at two issues that have played important roles in recent 
elections: abortion and gay rights. As has been discussed, scholars have noted 
the tendency of the hot-button abortion debate to create single-issue voters. 
Likewise, scholars noted the gay rights issue as a possible wedge issue in the 
2004 election. I will look at whether either of these issues has had a significant 
impact on Catholic voting behavior from 1992 to 2004, and whether Catholics 
appear to be single-issue voters.
To measure the impact of the abortion issue, I will use the following 
question:
By Law, When Should Abortion Be Allowed?
There has been some discussion about abortion during recent years. Which 
one of the opinions on this page best agrees with your view?
1. By law, abortion should never be permitted.
2. The law should permit abortion only in case of rape, incest, or when the 
woman's life is in danger.
3. The law should permit abortion for reasons other than rape, incest, or 
danger to the woman's life, but only after the need for the abortion has been 
clearly established.
4. By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion as a matter 
of personal choice.
To measure the impact of the gay rights issue, I will use the following 
questions:
182 Djupe, Paul A., “Religious Brand Loyalty and Political Loyalties,” Journal for the Scientific 
Study of Religion, 2000, p. 86.
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Do you think homosexuals should be allowed to serve in the United States
Armed Forces or don't you think so?
1. Yes, think so
2. Don't think so





This report contains several hypotheses:
• Catholics are more likely to be swing voters in America than non- 
Catholics (Hi). The null hypothesis (Ho) states that Catholics are not 
more likely to be swing voters than non-Catholics.
• Catholics have experienced a decline in the influence of ethnoreligious 
factors regarding voting behavior (H2). The null hypothesis (H0) states 
that Catholics have not experience a decline in the influence of 
ethnoreligious factors regarding voting behavior.
• Cultural issues are influencing Catholic voters (H3). The null hypothesis 
(Ho) states that cultural issues are not influencing Catholic voters.
• Single issues, such as abortion and gay rights, are significantly 
influencing Catholic voters (H4). The null hypothesis (Ho) states that 
single issues, such as abortion and gay rights, are not influencing 
Catholic voters.
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From 1992 to 2004, Catholics overall were slightly more likely to be swing 
voters than non-Catholics, particularly in 2000, which was the only year the 
results were significant.
Table 1






















1992: =1.161, df=1, not significant 
1996: xz=.452, df=1, not significant 
2000: x2=3.035, df=1, p<.05 
2004: x2=. 173, df=1t not significant 
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Evaluating the Ethnoreligious Model
Educational Levels
Catholic voters have been obtaining higher levels of education than voters 
of other denominations throughout the study period.
Table 2
Catholic and Non-Catholic Education Levels: 1992-2004
Catholic
Non-Catholic
1992 1996 2000 2004
Grade School 7% 4% 2% 3%
High School 42% 37% 34% 37%
Some College (No Degree) 26% 27% 31% 26%
College Degree 25% 32% 33% 34%
100% 100% 100% 100%
(N=) (568) (423) (459) (292)
Grade School 8% 5% 4% 3%
High School 46% 43% 36% 35%
Some College (No Degree) 23% 27% 30% 33%
College Degree 23% 26% 30% 29%
100% 100% 100% 100%
(N=) (1852) (1288) (1341) (920)
1992: x2-4.444, df=3, not significant 
1996: X2=7.033, df=3, p<.05 
2000: x2=4.566, df=3, not significant 
2004: ^=5.461, df=3, p<.05 
(Significance based on 1-sided t-test.)
The majority of the most educated Catholics -  those with a college degree 
-  are the fastest growing group of Catholics, and in 2004, the majority of voters in 
this group voted for the Republican presidential candidate. In addition, the 
majority of the least educated Catholics -  those with a high school diploma or 
less -  still fall in line with traditional ethnoreligious trends of voting for Democratic 
presidential candidates. However, these numbers have been declining since the 
percentage of Catholics with lower levels of education has been decreasing. The
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relationship between vote choice and education for Catholics was significant only








Grade School 72% 28% (18)
High School 69% 31% (123)
Some College (No Degree) 64% 36% (77)
College Degree 49% 51% (101)
Grade School 70% 30% (10)
High School 76% 24% (86)
Some College (No Degree) 57% 43% (72)
College Degree 47% 53% (106)
Grade School 75% 25% (4)
High School 57% 43% (97)
Some College (No Degree) 49% 51% (95)
College Degree 45% 55% (123)
Grade School 100% 0 (2)
High School 51% 49% (63)
Some College (No Degree) 56% 44% (50)
College Degree 46% 54% (82)
Note: The results for those with a grade school education are misleading because of the low 
number of respondents in the category. The results for 2000 reflect 4 respondents and the results 
for 2004 reflect just 2 respondents, both of whom voted for the Democratic candidate.
1992: ^=10.182, df=3, p<01 
1996: / = 1 6.568, df=3, p<.001 
2000: x2=3.709, df=3, not significant 
2004: X*=3.130, df=3, not significant 
(Significance based on 1-sided t-test.)
Changes in Income Levels
Catholics and non-Catholics are exhibiting similar trends regarding income 
levels as they do regarding educational levels. While the percentages differ
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slightly, Catholics and non-Catholics moved in concert regarding income levels 
over the four election cycles, with both groups seeing corresponding increases 
and decreases.
Table 4






1-16 percentile 17% 20% 16% 11%
17-33 percentile 17% 18% 21% 23%
34-67 percentile 23% 28% 32% 32%
68-95 percentile 37% 28% 24% 31%
96-100 percentile 7% 7% 7% 4%
100% 100% 100% 100%
(N=) (534) (387) (378) (262)
1-16 percentile 17% 20% 16% 18%
17-33 percentile 16% 16% 22% 20%
34-67 percentile 25% 32% 30% 25%
68-95 percentile 35% 26% 25% 33%
96-100 percentile 6% 6% 7% 3%
100% 100% 100% 100%
(N=) (1747) (1177) (1137) (808)
‘ Percentile correspond to the following annual incomes:
1992: 1-16: none-$9,999; 17-33: $10,000-$19,999; 34-67: $20,000-$39,999; 68-95: $40,000- 
$89,999; 96-100: $90,000+
1996: 1-16: none-$11,999; 17-33: $12,000-$21,999; 34-67: $22,000-$49,999; 68-95: $50,000- 
$104,999; 96-100: $105,000+
2000: 1-16: none-$14,999; 17-33: $15,000-$34,999; 34-67: $35,000-$64,999; 68-95: $65,000- 
$124,999; 96-100: $125,000+
2004: 1-16: none-$14,999; 17-33: $15,000-$34,999; 34-67: $35,000-$69,999; 68-95: $65,000- 
$119,000; 96-100: $120,000+
1992: x?=22.061, df=4, p<.001 
1996:=16.989, df=4, p<.001 
2000: /  =18.040, df=4, p<.001 
2004: xz=12.402, df=4, p<.01 
(Significance based on 1-sided t-test.)
In looking at voting behavior and income, the results reveal multiple 
instances of gains and losses for Democrats and Republican candidates over the 
study period. Overall, candidates from both parties experienced a net gain in
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votes from the least wealthy Catholics. The most wealthy Catholics shifted their 
support over the study period from Democrat to Republican candidates. The 
relationship between voting behavior and income for Catholics was significant 
every year.
56
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table 5






1-16 percentile 64% 36% (28)
17-33 percentile 71% 30% (44)
34-67 percentile 72% 28% (106)
68-95 percentile 50% 50% (104)
96-100 percentile 55% 45% (20)
1-16 percentile 78% 22% (23)
17-33 percentile 67% 33% (33)
34-67 percentile 63% 39% (95)
68-95 percentile 51% 49% (82)
96-100 percentile 48% 52% (21)
1-16 percentile 69% 31% (29)
17-33 percentile 57% 43% (56)
34-67 percentile 50% 50% (70)
68-95 percentile 51% 49% (93)
96-100 percentile 26% 74% (19)
1-16 percentile 55% 45% (20)
17-33 percentile 71% 29% (24)
34-67 percentile 60% 40% (55)
68-95 percentile 43% 57% (58)
96-100 percentile 33% 67% (21)
1992: X2 =12.425, df=4, p<005 
1996: x 2= 8 .  164, df=4, p<05  
2000: x2=9.152, df=4, p<05  
2004:^=9.663, df=4, p<.01 
(Significance based on 1-sided t-test.)
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Region
The relationship between Catholic voting behavior and region was 
significant only in 1992 and 2000. Catholics in the Northeast and the South were 
more likely to vote for a Republican candidate in 2004 than they were in 1992. 
Since 1992, support from Northeast Catholics has shifted from the Democratic to 
Republican candidates, which is important considering the Northeast is consider 
the high number of Catholics residing in the region. Support for Democratic 
candidates also has weakened in the West. In 1992, 74 percent of Catholics in 
the West voted for Clinton; in 2004, just 51 percents supported Kerry. The only 
region that has not experienced substantial change regarding Catholic voting 
behavior is the North Central United States.
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Table 6
Catholic Voting Behavior and Region 1992-2004
Democrat Republican (N=)
Northeast 69% 32% (114)
North Central 52% 48% (104)
South 60% 40% (60)
West 74% 26% (49)
1996
Northeast 65% 35% (74)
North Central 54% 46% (93)
South 58% 42% (62)
West 64% 36% (47)
2000
Northeast 51% 49% (91)
North Central 53% 47% (106)
South 33% 67% (66)
West 65% 35% (57)
2004
Northeast 54% 46% (56)
North Central 53% 47% (70)
South 41% 59% (32)
West 51% 49% (39)
1992:^=9.332, df=3, p<05  
1996: x2=2.570, df=3, not significant 
2000:x*=12.742, df=3, p<01 
2004: ^ = 1.620, df=3, not significant 
(Significance based on 1-sided t-test.)
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Hispanic Voters
Hispanic voters are much more likely to be Catholics than non-Catholics. 
These results were significant every year. The percentage of Catholics who are 
Hispanic has been relatively stable over the four election cycles, averaging 18 
percent. In comparison, the percentage of non-Catholic Hispanics has averaged 
about 5 percent over the same period. In addition, about half of the Hispanics 
surveyed identified themselves as Catholic.
Table 7
Hispanic Catholic and Non-Catholic Voters: 1992-2004
Catholics
Non-Catholics
1992 1996 2000 2004
Hispanic 21% 18% 16% 18%
Non-Hispanic 79% 82% 84% 82%
(N=) (577) (425) (458) (291)
Hispanic 5% 5% 4% 7%
Non-Hispanic 94% 95% 96% 93%
(N=) (1884) (1285) (1333) (905)
1992: J=125.456, df=1, p<001 
1996:^=66.068, df=1, p<001 
2000: x2=69.596, df=1, p<.001 
2004:^=32.774, df=1, p<001 
(Significance based on 1-sided t-test.)
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However, these results were significant only in 1992 and 1996 when 
Hispanics and non-Hispanic Catholics exhibited different voting behavior, with 
Hispanic Catholics overwhelmingly supporting Democratic candidates. The 
relationship between Hispanic identification and voting behavior for Catholics 
declined in significance over the study period, with it being significant in 1992 and 
1996 and not significant in 2000 and 2004.
Table 8









1992: x2=4.077, df=1, p<05  
1996:^=14.976, df=1, p<001 
2000: x 2= 2 .  113, df=1, not significant 
2004: x2=.123, df=1, not significant 
(Significance based on 1-sided t-test.)
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1992-2004
1992 1996 2000 2004
75% 86% 63% 55%
25% 14% 37% 45%
(52) (43) (32) (22)
60% 55% 49% 51%
40% 45% 51% 49%
(274) (233) (286) (174)
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Evaluating the Culture Wars Thesis
Church Attendance
Since 1992, Catholics church attendance has declined significantly. 
Despite the drop in attendance, Catholics still go to church more often than non- 
Catholics. However, by 2000, those percentages were moving close to each 
other, indicating that Catholics were becoming more similar to other religions 
regarding how often they practiced their faith. And while the relationship between 
religion and church attendance was significant every year, it declined in 
significance in 2004.
Table 9
Catholic and Non-Catholic Church Attendance: 1992-2004
1992 1996 2000 2004
Every Week 34% 32% 28% 27%
Almost Every Week 12% 15% 15% 12%
Once or Twice a 
Month 14% 16% 17% 19%
Few Times a Year 18% 18% 18% 16%
Never 22% 19% 22% 27%
100% 100% 100% 100%
(N=) (580) (425) (460) (291)
Non-Catholics
Every Week 25% 24% 26% 23%
Almost Every Week 10% 11% 10% 12%
Once or Twice a 14% 14% 14% 14%Month
Few Times a Year 14% 18% 15% 15%
Never 37% 33% 34% 36%
100% 100% 100% 100%
(N=) (1892) (1280) (1329) (913)
1992: y?=52.590, df=4, p<001 
1996: f =35.272, df=4, p<.001 
2000: y?=28.113, df=4, p<001 
2004: x2=10.443, df=4, p<.05 
(Significance based on 1-sided t-test.)
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More church-going Catholics have shifted their voting behavior from 1992 
to 2004 to voting for more conservative candidates. At the same time, however, 
even less religious Catholics appear to be moving toward Republican candidates, 
including in 2000 when half of “secular” Catholics voted for Bush. The 
relationship between church attendance and voting behavior was significant 
every year except 2000.
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Table 10






Every Week 56% 44%
Almost Every Week 49% 51%
Once or Twice a Month 65% 35%




Every Week 50% 50%
Almost Every Week 59% 41%
Once or Twice a Month 72% 28%




Every Week 48% 53%
Almost Every Week 47% 53%
Once or Twice a Month 54% 46%




Every Week 43% 57%
Almost Every Week 54% 46%
Once or Twice a Month 25% 75%




1992: f = 1 9.027, df=4, p<.001 
1996: x2=7.891, df=4, p<.05 
2000: x2=1.768, df=4, not significant 
2004: x2 =17.408, df=4, p<001  
(Significance based on 1-sided t-test.)
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Single-Issue Voters
Abortion
Catholics have become more conservative in their views on abortion since 
1992, and are slightly more conservative on the issue than non-Catholics, who 
also have become more conservative on the issue since 1992. However, the 
relationship between abortion and voters in general was significant only in 2000.
Table 11
Catholic and Non-Catholic Views on Abortion: 1992-2004
1992 1996 2000 2004
Catholics
Never Permitted By Law 12% 13% 9% 14%
By Law, Only in Case of Rape 30% 32% 34% 34%
By Law, Only in Case of Rape 
and Woman’s Life in Danger 25% 18% 16% 18%
By Law, Always 43% 38% 41% 34%
(N=) (316) (272) (309) (192)
Non-Catholics
Never Permitted By Law 10% 12% 13% 13%
By Law, Only in Case of Rape 28% 29% 28% 31%
By Law, Only in Case of Rape 
and Woman’s Life in Danger 14% 16% 15% 18%
By Law, Always 48% 44% 44% 38%
(N=) (1006) (742) (783) (604)
1992: x2=4.546, df=3, not significant 
1996: X*=4.991, df=3, not significant 
2000: =8.069, df=3, p<05.
2004: x2=1.355, df=3, not significant 
(Significance based on 1-sided t-test.)
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Conservative and liberal Catholics had become polarized on the issue by 2004, 
with those favoring the strongest abortion restrictions supporting the Republican 
candidate and those favoring little or no abortion restrictions supporting the 
Democratic candidate. For Catholics, the relationship between abortion and 
voting behavior was significant for every year.
Table 12






Never Permitted By Law 58% 42% (33)
By Law, Only in Case of Rape 49% 51% (93)
By Law, Only in Case of Rape and 58% 42% (48)
Woman’s Life in Danger 
By Law, Always 76% 24% (142)
Never Permitted By Law 51% 49% (37)
By Law, Only in Case of Rape 50% 50% (92)
By Law, Only in Case of Rape and 59% 41% (49)
Woman’s Life in Danger 
By Law, Always 71% 29% (94)
Never Permitted By Law 39% 61% (28)
By Law, Only in Case of Rape 45% 55% (109)
By Law, Only in Case of Rape and 38% 69% (55)
Woman’s Life in Danger 
By Law, Always 62% 38% (117)
Never Permitted By Law 31% 69% (26)
By Law, Only in Case of Rape 37% 63% (62)
By Law, Only in Case of Rape and 61% 39% (38)
Woman’s Life in Danger 
By Law, Always 65% 35% (66)
1992: S  =18.641, df=3, p<.001 
1996: ^=9.843, df=3, p<01 
2000: x2=12.653, df=3, p<.01 
2004: x*=15.701, df=3, p<001 
(Significance based on 1-sided t-test.)
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Gav Rights
Catholics are more likely to support gays serving in the military than non- 
Catholics. The results were significant for every year except 2004.
Table 13
Catholic and Non-Catholic Views on Whether
Catholics
Non-Catholics
Gays Should Serve in the Military
1992 1996 2000 2004
Agree 64% 76% 81% 84%
Disagree 36% 24% 19% 16%
100% 100% 100% 100%
(N=) (486) (375) (434) (256)
Agree 57% 66% 74% 80%
Disagree 43% 34% 26% 20%
100% 100% 100% 100%
(N=) (1646) (1108) (1265) (770)
1992: /=7.022, df=1, p<05  
1996:^=12.324, df=1, p<001 
2000: y?=7.946, df=1, p<.01 
2004: x2=1.292, df=1, not significant 
(Significance based on 1-sided t-test.)
In addition, Catholics have become less polarized on the issue and by 
2004, a substantial majority of those who voted for the Democratic and 
Republican candidates supported gays serving in the military. The relationship 
between voting behavior and gays serving in the military was significant every 
year, although it declined slightly in 2004.
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Table 14
Catholic Voting Behavior and Views on Whether 






















1992: x2=29.346, df=1, p<001 
1996: x2=18.574, df=1, p<.001 
2000: x*=71.340, df=1, p<.001 
2004: x2=2.075, df=1, not significant 
(Significance based on 1-sided t-test.)
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Likewise, Catholics are more likely to support laws that protect gays from 
job discrimination than non-Catholics. The results were significant for every year.
Table 15
Catholic and Non-Catholic Views on Whether There Should Be Laws 
Protecting Gays Against Job Discrimination
1992 1996 2000 2004
Favor Laws 68% 72% 74% 82%
Oppose Laws 32% 28% 26% 18%
100% 100% 100% 100%
(N=) (490) (358) (380) (254)
Non-Catholics
Favor Laws 58% 61% 65% 73%
Oppose Laws 42% 39% 35% 27%
100% 100% 100% 100%
(N=) (1649) (1080) (1093) (771)
1992: ^-17.144, df=1, p<001 
1996: x*=13.047, df=1, p<001 
2000: x*=10.770, df=1, p<001 
2004: x2=8.593, df=1, p<05  
(Significance based on 1-sided t-test.)
And like the results regarding Catholic voting behavior and gays serving in 
the military, by 2004, Catholics were the least polarized on the issue of protecting 
gays against job discrimination, regardless of party. A substantial majority of 
Catholics who voted for the Democratic and Republican candidates supported 
such laws. The relationship between Catholic voting behavior and views on 
protection of gays against job discriminations was significant for every year 
except 2004.
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Table 16
Catholic Voting Behavior and Views on Whether There Should Be Laws






Favor Laws 77% 59%
Oppose Laws 23% 41%
100% 100%
(N=) (196) (116)
Favor Laws 79% 59%
Oppose Laws 21% 41%
100% 100%
(N=) (160) (103)
Favor Laws 84% 64%
Oppose Laws 16% 36%
100% 100%
(N=) (154) (150)
Favor Laws 86% 83%
Oppose Laws 14% 17%
100% 100%
(N=) (97) (94)
1992:^=11.093, df=1, p<001 
1996: x2=12.483, df=1, p<001 
2000: x2=16.604, df=1, p<001 
2004: )?=.242, df=1, not significant 
(Significance based on 1-sided t-test.)
70
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION 
Catholics As Swing Voters
Catholics are more likely to vote like non-Catholics than stand apart as 
swing voters. In three of the four elections cycles, the swing voter variable for 
Catholics was not significant. More importantly, Catholics appear to have more in 
common with non-Catholics as a whole regarding how they vote than ever 
before. Like the rest of the electorate, Catholics today are split 50-50 on who they 
support for president and appear to shift their support for candidates from 
election year to election year depending on the current political, cultural and 
economic issues. The results of this analysis support this conclusion and allow 
for a rejection of the hypothesis that Catholics are swing voters.
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Graph 1
Catholic and Non-Catholic Swing Voters: 1992 -2004
■  Catholic
■  Non-Catholic
1992 1996 2000 2004
Swing Voters By Year
Independent Sample 
1992: x 2= 7. 161, df=1, not significant 
1996: x2-.452, df=1, not significant 
2000:^=3.035, df=1, p<.05 
2004: x2—. 173, df=1, not significant 
(Significance based on 1-sided t-test.)
The Ethnoreligious Model
Education
In looking at ethnoreligious factors, traditional ethnoreligious ties to the 
Democratic Party appear to have weakened since 1992. Catholics and non- 
Catholics are experiencing similar trends regarding voting behavior and higher 
levels of education. In 1992, 51 percent of Catholics had attended college, with 
half earning a degree. In comparison, 46 percent of non-Catholics had attended 
college or obtained a degree. By 2004, Catholics who had attended college or
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earned a degree increased to 60 percent, with 62 percent of non-Catholics doing 
the same.
The majority of the least educated Catholics -  those with a high school 
diploma or less -  still fall in line with traditional ethnoreligious trends of voting for 
Democratic presidential candidates. However, these numbers have been 
declining since the percentage of Catholics with lower levels of education has 
been decreasing. While it appears Democratic candidates have been making 
huge gains in attracting the least educated Catholics (those with just a grade 
school education), in real numbers, the percentage of voters in that group has 
dropped substantially. For example, in 1992, those with only a grade school 
education represented 6 percent of Catholic voters; by 2004, they represented 
just 1 percent. The 2004 statistic of 100 percent represents the two Catholic 
voters with a grade school education, who voted for John Kerry.
At the same time, the percentage of most educated Catholics (those with 
a college degree) has been increasing. In 1992, 32 percent of Catholic voters 
had a college degree; by 2004, 42 percent of Catholic voters had a college 
degree. This appears to be a boon for Republicans, who have been slightly more 
successful in gaining support from this growing group of Catholic voters. Those 
who have attended college but didn’t complete a degree have been swinging 
their majority votes between the two parties, and with the majority voting for the 
Democratic candidate in 2004. This group of voters as a percentage of all 
Catholic voters has been stable over the four election cycles, not changing more
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Graph 2
Catholic Voting Behavior of High School Graduates
1992 1996 2000 2004
Year
■  Democrat 
U Republican
Independent Sample 
1992: =10.182, df=3, p<.01 
1996: =16.568, df=3, p<.001 
2000: x2=3. 709, df=3, not significant 
2004: x2=3.130, df=3, not significant 
(Significance based on 1-sided t-test.)
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Graph 3
Catholic Voting Behavior of College Graduates
■  Democrat
■  Republican
1992 1996 2000 2004
Year
Independent Sample 
1992:^=10.182, df=3, p<.01 
1996:^=16.568, df=3, p<.001 
2000: x2=3. 709, df=3, not significant 
2004: x 2= 3. 130, df=3, not significant 
(Significance based on 1-sided t-test.)
than a one to two percentage points each year. They now account for 25 percent 
of Catholic voters, the smallest percentage for the group of the four election 
years. In addition, by 2004 high school graduates had essentially split their votes 
between Democratic and Republican candidates. High school graduates 
represent the second largest group of Catholic voters (32 percent in 2004) so 
attracting the votes of this group is critical for candidates.
In general, Catholic voters at all educational levels (except for those who 
had completed just grade school) were essentially split 50-50 by 2004 on their 
choice for president. These results indicate that Catholics appear to have moved
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away from their traditional ethnoreligious ties to the Democratic Party and are 
more likely to vote in patterns similar to the electorate at large, which in 2000 and 
2004 had split its votes between the candidates of the two major parties. The 
relationship between education and voting behavior was significant only in 1992 
and 1996.
Income
Catholics and non-Catholics are exhibiting similar trends regarding income 
levels, trending together over the four election periods. In 1992, 43 percent of 
Catholics and 42 percent of non-Catholics had an income level at the 68 
percentile or greater. By 2004, that had dropped to 35 percent for Catholics and 
37 percent for non-Catholics.
Although candidates from both parties gained votes from the least wealthy 
Catholics over the study period, by 2004 there was an apparent split based 
income, with wealthier Catholics voting for the Republican candidate and less 
wealthier Catholics supporting the Democratic candidate. Only in 1992 did the 
Democratic candidate attract a majority of the most wealthy Catholics (incomes 
above $120,000). By 2000 74 percent of the wealthiest Catholics voted for 
Republican George W. Bush. Democrat Bob Kerry regained some support from 
the most wealthy Catholics in 2004, but Bush still appeared to be the pick of top 
earners with 67 percent voting for him. Even among the 31 percent of middle and 
upper income Catholics who earned between $65,000 and $119,000, Bush was 
the favored candidate. The majority of Catholics with incomes less than $65,000 
preferred the Democratic candidate. The results of the multivariate analyses
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further support the conclusion that the most wealthy Catholics prefer the 
Republican candidate; in both 2000 and 2004 years, the relationship was 
significant.
Other Ethnoreligious Factors
In addition to looking at education and income, this study evaluated the 
relationship between Hispanic Catholics and voting behavior, as well as regional 
distinctions and voting behavior.
Hispanic voters are much more likely to be Catholics than non-Catholics. 
These results were significant every year. The percentage of Catholics who are 
Hispanic has been relatively stable over the four election cycles, averaging 18 
percent. In comparison, the percentage of non-Catholic Hispanics has averaged 
about 5 percent over the same period. In addition, about half of the Hispanics 
surveyed identified themselves as Catholic.
While Hispanic Catholics are more likely to vote for the Democratic 
presidential candidate than non-Hispanic Catholics, they have been gradually 
withdrawing their support for Democratic candidates since 1992. The high water 
mark of the period for Catholic Hispanic support of a Democratic presidential 
candidate was in 1996, when 86 percent of Hispanic Catholics voted for Bill 
Clinton.
Republican George W. Bush heavily lobbied for the Latino vote in 2000 
and 2004. It’s not a surprise that by 2004, voting trends for Hispanic and non- 
Hispanic Catholics very similar, with a near split in the votes for candidates of
77
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
each party. However, the results were significant only in 1992 and 1996 when 
Hispanic Catholics overwhelmingly supporting Democratic candidates.
100%
Graph 4





1992 1996 2000 2004
Hispanic Voters
Independent Sample 
1992:^=4.077, df=1, p<.05 
1996: =14.976, df=1, p<.001 
2000: y?=2.113, df=1, not significant 
2004: x2=. 123, df=1, not significant 
(Significance based on 1-sided t-test.)
Given the high percentage of Hispanics who are Catholics, an assessment 
of Hispanic Catholic voting behavior is an opportunity for further study.
Region
Regarding the regional variables, it appears that Southern Catholics are 
the most likely to support Republican candidates. The relationship between 
voting behavior and living in the South was highly significant in 2000. What is 
remarkable about 2000 is the dramatic shift in the Southern Catholic vote,
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increasing 25 percentage points from 1996. This may reflect the national debates 
about moral character following the Lewinsky scandal that consumed the country 
at the time. Out of all Catholics in the regions, Southern Catholics were the only 
ones to vote in the majority at any point during the study period for a Republican 
candidate, doing so in 2000 and 2004.
Although the relationship between voting behavior and the variables for 
the Northeast and West were not significant at any point during the study period, 
it appears that Northeast and Western Catholics have experienced a shift over 
the study period toward supporting Republican candidates. Northeast Catholics, 
who represent an epicenter of Catholics in America, increased their support for 
Republican candidates by 14 percentage points from 1992 to 2004, and in 2000 
nearly split their votes evenly between the Democratic and Republican 
candidates. In the West, Republican support from Catholics increased 23 
percentage points over the period, and in 2004, essentially split their votes 
between Bush and Kerry. Interestingly, the debate over gay marriage took center 
stage in the Northeast (Massachusetts) and the West (San Francisco) in 
advance of the 2004 presidential election. If cultural issues are influencing the 
Catholic vote, the gay marriage debate in these two regions may have had some 
bearing on the increase in support for the Republican candidate from Catholics in 
the Northeast and West. The only other significant regional variable was for 
Catholic voters in the North Central states in 1992, who were slightly more likely 
to support the Republican candidate that year. The North Central states include 
significant population centers of Catholics in Chicago and Pennsylvania.
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However, voting behavior of Catholics living in the North Central region was 
relatively unchanged and relatively split between the Democratic and Republican 
candidates over the study period.
In evaluating the ethnoreligious model, it appears Catholics, as a class, 
have shifted from one of less educated, less affluent blue collar workers who 
support Democratic candidates to one of more educated, more affluent 
professionals who have shifted away from their strong support for Democrats. 
Given the significant relationship regarding the education and income variables 
measuring aspects of class and voting behavior, class politics still appear to be 
an important factor in voting behavior. These results are supported by studies of 
realignments of class politics in Western European democracies, which have 
concluded that “unskilled workers have become less distinctive in their partisan 
alignments over time, but other classes have experienced offsetting changes, 
yielding little evidence of a universal decline in the class cleavage.”183 Therefore, 
I am rejecting the hypothesis that Catholics have experienced a decline factors 
influencing in the ethnoreligious model.
The Culture Wars Thesis
In evaluating the culture wars thesis, the results of the analysis indicate 
that the relationship between church attendance and voting behavior for 
Catholics was significant every year except 2000. Understanding Catholic 
Church attendance trends is important because according to the culture wars 
thesis, people who attend church more often tend to vote for Republican
183 Brooks, Clem, Nieuwbeertab, Paul, and Manza, Jeff, “Cleavage-based voting behavior in 
cross-national perspective: Evidence from six postwar democracies,” Social Science Research,
35, 2006, p. 89.
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candidates. In the case of Catholic voting behavior, the culture wars thesis 
appears to be valid.
Catholics appear to attend church more often than non-Catholics; 
however, Catholic attendance at Mass appears to be declining. In 1992, 46 
percent of Catholic attended Mass every week or nearly every week; by 2004, 
that number had dropped to 39 percent. In comparison, the percentage of 
church-going non-Catholics was stable over the study period at 35 percent. In 
addition, Catholics who said they never attend Mass increased from 22 percent 
to 27 percent from 1992 to 2004. At the same time, the percentage of secular 
non-Catholics was relatively unchanged over the period and stood at 36 percent 
in 2004.
Despite the drop in attendance, Catholics still go to church more often 
than non-Catholics. This could be a boon for Republican candidates, since 
Catholics who attend church more often overall have shifted their voting behavior 
from 1992 to 2004 to voting for more conservative candidates. Even less 
religious Catholics appear to be moving toward Republican candidates.
Until 2000, more church-going Catholics tended to vote for Democratic 
presidential candidates. Clinton received more support from Catholics who 
attended church every week in 1992, than did Bush. By 1996, the Democrats 
made substantial gains with moderately religious voters -  those who occasionally 
attended services or did so nearly every week. Though the most religious 
Catholics had split their votes equally between the Democratic and Republican 
candidates, both parties increased their percentage of votes from those who
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attended Mass every week. Clinton made substantial gains among less religious 
voters at all levels, including a 10 percentage-point gain among those who are in 
the pews nearly every week over 1992.
However in 2000, church-going Catholics appeared to slightly shift in a 
more conservative direction, with 53 percent voting for the Republican candidate. 
Those who attended church nearly every week experienced a more substantial 
shift toward the Republican candidate; 53 percent voted for Bush in 2000, 
compared to 41 percent who voted for Dole in 1996. In addition, Republicans 
made substantial gains with voters who attend church less often. Perhaps most 
surprising is that non-church going “secular” Catholics who traditionally favor 
Democratic candidates split their votes between the Democratic and Republican 
candidates.
By 2004, a majority of Catholic voters who attended Mass more often 
were voting for Republican candidates and those attending Mass less often or 
not at all were voting for Democratic candidates. Of those who attended Mass 
every week, 57 percent voted for Bush. The Democrats made up ground with 
those who attended Mass nearly every week, but lost a huge portion -  29 
percentage points -  of Catholics who went to Mass once or twice a month. 
Catholics who rarely or never attended Mass, however, overwhelmingly voted for 
Democrat Bob Kerry. The same was true overall for 2000, although the gap 
between more and less religious voters was not as wide. This phenomenon may 
indicate that Catholics are being affected by cultural issues that are influencing 
more conservative, church-going Catholics to support Republican candidates and
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Graph 5
Voting Behavior of Catholics Who Attend Mass Every Week
1992 1996 2000 2004




1992:^=19.027, df=4, p<.001 
1996:^=7.891, df=4, p<.05 
2000: )f=1.768, df=4, not significant 
2004:=17.408, df=4, p<.001 
(Significance based on 1-sided t-test.)
more liberal, less church-going Catholics to vote for Democratic candidates.
It appears that cultural issues are influencing Catholics voting behavior. 
The relationship between church attendance and abortion was highly significant 
every year, with those who attend church more often having the most restrictive 
views on abortion. At the same time, there were highly significant relationships 
regarding voting behavior for the variables measuring two polarizing cultural
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Graph 6
Voting Behavior o f Catholics Who 
Attend Mass a Few Times a Year
50%
■  Democrat 
a  Republican
1992 1996 2000 2004
Year
Independent Sample 
1992:^=19.027, df=4, p<.001 
1996:^=7.891, df=4, p<.05 
2000:^=1.768, df=4, not significant 
2004:^=17.408, df=4, p<.001 
(Significance based on 1-sided t-test.)
issues -  abortion and gay rights. Given that the analysis indicated a significant 
relationship between church attendance and voting behavior, and that church 
attendance is an extremely strong predictor of views on abortion, I can conclude 
that the culture wars thesis strongly influences Catholic voting behavior and 
reject the null hypothesis that cultural issues are not influencing Catholic voters.
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Single-Issue Voters
Abortion
The variables used to measure whether Catholics appear to be single­
issue voters on highly debated cultural issues, abortion and gay rights, were 
highly significant during nearly every election cycle for candidates of both parties. 
Catholics who supported Democratic candidates hold more liberal views on both 
issues, and Catholics who supported Republican candidates hold more 
conservative views on both issues.
Graph 7
Catholic Voters Who Never Support Abortion
■ Democrat
■  Republican
1992 1996 2000 2004
Year
Independent Sample 
1992:^=18.641, df=3, p<.001 
1996:^=9.843, df=3, p<.01 
2000:^=12.653, df=3, p<.01 
2004:^=15.701, df=3, p<.001 
(Significance based on 1-sided t-test.)
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Graph 8
Catholic Voters Who Always Support Abortion
■  Democrat
■  Republican
1992 1996 2000 2004
Year
Independent Sample 
1992: x2=18.641, df=3, p<.001 
1996:^=9.843, df=3, p<.01 
2000:^=12.653, df=3, p<.01 
2004:^=15.701, df=3, p<.001 
(Significance based on 1-sided t-test.)
Overall, Catholics have become more conservative in their views on 
abortion since 1992. In 1992, 42 percent of Catholics held the most restrictive 
views on the issue, believing that abortion should be illegal or only permitted in 
the case of rape. By 2004, that number had increased to 48 percent. Even those 
who made exceptions for rape and when a woman’s life was in danger 
decreased 7 percentage points from 25 percent in 1992 to 18 percent in 2004. At 
the same time, the percentage of Catholics who believe abortion should be 
allowed in all situations dropped 9 percent from 43 percent to 34 percent.
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In addition, a comparison of Catholic voting behavior and views on 
abortion shows a clear and growing divide between those who hold more 
traditional, conservative Catholic views on abortion and those who hold more 
liberal views on abortion. In 1992, the Democratic candidate drew 58 percent of 
the voters who thought abortion should be illegal. By 2004, that percentage had 
plummeted to 31 percent. At the same time, Republican candidates nearly 
doubled their support from this group, with 42 percent of those who believed 
abortion should be illegal voting for the Republican candidate in 1992 and 69 
percent voting for the GOP in 2004. Although Republican candidates gained 
some support from Catholics who held more liberal views on the legality of 
abortion, by 2004 there was a clear split: those holding conservative views on 
abortion preferred Republican candidates and those holding liberal views on 
abortion preferred Democratic candidates. In the analysis, the relationship 
between abortion and voting behavior was significant for every year.
The results reinforce the conclusion that Catholics who voted for 
Republican candidates tended to be more conservative regarding under what 
circumstances abortion should be legal, if at all. By 2004, they were the most 
polarized on the issue, with those favoring the strongest abortion restrictions 
favoring Republican candidates and those favoring wider access to abortion 
favoring Democratic candidates.
Interestingly, Catholics’ views on abortion appear in sync with other 
denominations, which also have shifted to favor more restrictive measures 
regarding the procedure. In 1992, 38 percent of non-Catholics held the most
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restrictive views on abortion; by 2004, that number had increased to 44 percent. 
In addition, the percentage of non-Catholics who believed abortion should be 
legal without restriction dropped 10 percentage points from 48 in 1992 to 38 
percent in 2004. While the percentage of Catholics who held more restrictive 
views on abortion is slightly higher than non-Catholics, their views were shifting 
in the same direction as non-Catholics. This indicates that cultural issues may be 
impacting the views of the entire electorate, including Catholics. Had Catholics 
held substantially different views about abortion in comparison to non-Catholics, 
one could hypothesize that the teachings of the Catholic Church may be 
influencing Catholic voters. While the Catholic Church’s views on abortion may 
influence Catholics to some extent (given that they, in general, hold more 
restrictive beliefs on abortion than non-Catholics), it appears that the issue of 
abortion is a cultural issue that is dividing Americans of all faiths.
Gay Rights
Catholics have become more supportive of certain gay rights over the 
study period. They consistently were more supportive of gays serving in the 
military and job protection of gays than non-Catholics every year of the study 
period. In addition, Catholics who supported these gay rights tended to vote for 
Democratic candidates, although the relationship declined in significance over 
the study period until it was no longer significant in 2004.
Regarding gays serving the military, Catholic support increased from 64 
percent in 1992 to 84 percent in 2004. In comparison, non-Catholic support for 
gay military service increased from 57 percent in 1992 to 80 percent in 2004.
88
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Graph 9




1992 1996 2000 2004
Support fo r Gays Serving in th e  M ilitary
Independent Sample 
1992: =29.346, df=1, p<.001 
1996: =18.574, df=1, p<.001 
2000:^=11.340, df=1, p<.001 
2004: x2=2.075, df=1, not significant 
(Significance based on 1-sided t-test.)
Over the study period, Catholics were more supportive of gays serving in the 
military than non-Catholics, and by 2004, the two groups were more in 
agreement on the issue than at any other point in the study period. By 2004, the 
relationship between Catholic voting behavior and gay military service was no 
longer significant.
In addition, Catholics who strongly supported gays serving in the military 
tended to vote for Democratic candidates. In 1992, there was a clear division 
based on voter choice, with 77 percent of Catholics who voted for the Democratic 
candidate supporting gay military service, compared to 47 percent of Catholic
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who voted for the Republican candidate. By 2004, however, large majorities of 
Catholics who supported candidates of both parties also supported gays serving 
the military.
On the issue of support for laws that protect gays from job discrimination, 
Catholics are more likely to support such laws than non-Catholics. The results 
were significant for every year. In 1992, 68 percent of Catholics favored such 
laws, compared to 58 percent of non-Catholics. By 2004, 82 percent of Catholics 
believed gays should be protected from job discrimination, compared to 73 
percent of non-Catholics.
Graph 10 
Catholic Voters Who Favor Laws 




1992 1996 2000 2004
Support For Protecting Gays Against Job Discrim ination
Independent Sample 
1992: x2=11.093, df=1, p<.001 
1996:^=12.483, df=1, p<.001 
2000:^=16.604, df=1, p<.001 
2004: x2=.242, df=1, not significant 
(Significance based on 1-sided t-test.)
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In addition, Catholics who supported laws protecting gays from 
discrimination tended to vote for Democratic candidates. This relationship was 
significant every year except 2004. And like the results regarding Catholic voting 
behavior and gays serving in the military, by 2004, Catholics were the least 
polarized on the issue of protecting gays against job discrimination, regardless of 
party. A substantial majority of Catholics who voted for the Democratic and 
Republican candidates -  86 percent of Democratic voters and 83 percent of 
Republican voters — supported such laws.
Finally, although the issue of whether gays should be able to adopt 
children was measured only in 1992, 2000 and 2004, the results indicate a highly 
significant relationship every year with voting behavior. In addition, both liberal 
and conservative Catholics have experienced a shift in their views on gay 
adoption, becoming more supportive of it. In 1992, 40 percent of those who voted 
for the Democratic candidate and 19 percent of those who voted for the 
Republican candidate supported gay adoption; by 2004 those numbers had 
increased to 68 percent of Democratic voters and 45 percent of Republican 
voters. It appears that Catholics are becoming more supportive of gay adoption 
as they have become more supportive of other gay civil rights. Unfortunately, 
data about views on gay marriage, which was called a wedge issue in the 2004 
presidential election, was not available over the study period from the dataset 
used. Given that the issue of traditional vs. non-traditional marriage has strong 
religious overtones, further study of Catholic voting behavior and new gay civil 
rights issues warrants close attention.
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The results of this analysis indicate that Catholics have strong tendencies 
toward being single-issue voters on cultural issues, particularly regarding 
abortion. Therefore, I can reject the null hypothesis that single issues, such as 
abortion and gay rights, are not significantly influencing Catholic voters.
Final Thoughts
The results of this analysis confirm that Catholics voters are not swing 
voters in American politics. They appear to be split 50-50 on who to vote for 
president that is in keeping with voting trends across the nation. Although class 
and cultural issues have significantly influenced Catholic voting behavior, they 
also have significantly influenced non-Catholic voting behavior in similar ways. 
While the “Catholic Vote” may once have been a significant factor in electoral 
politics, today Catholics are more likely to vote like the rest of the country than 
ever before.
Today’s Catholics are more educated and more affluent than their 
ancestors, and these two factors appear to positively impact their support for 
Republican candidates. Regional distinctions do not appear to play a substantial 
role in Catholic voting behavior, although Southern Catholics are more likely to 
vote for Republican candidates. In contrast, Hispanic Catholics are more likely to 
vote for Democratic candidates, although that support has weakened 
substantially since 1992. Given that Hispanics represent approximately 20 
percent of all Catholics and that Hispanics are the largest and fastest growing
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minority in the United States184, trends regarding Hispanic Catholic voting 
behavior merit further study.
On cultural matters, the abortion issue appears to be one of the most 
polarizing for Catholics. Those who hold conservative views on abortion now 
tend to favor Republican candidates and those with liberal views now appear to 
prefer Democratic candidates. In addition, the relationship between Catholic 
voting behavior and gay rights issues was significant for certain years during the 
study period and indicated that Catholics with more liberal views about gay rights 
voted for Democratic candidates, while conservative Catholics favored 
Republican candidates. The results found there was a significant relationship 
between church attendance and voting behavior in most years, with Catholics 
who attend Mass more often tending to vote for conservative candidates and 
those who attend less often favoring liberal Candidates. While the culture wars 
thesis may be impacting Catholic voting behavior, Catholics also appear to have 
strongly tendencies toward being single-issue voters.
The conclusion that Catholics are strongly influenced by a combination of 
religious, cultural and class factors finds support in the academic community. 
According to Kohut and his colleagues, “It is important not to overstate the impact 
of religion on attitudes, party identification and voting behavior. Religion is only 
one of many influences on political behavior: a ‘multiplicity of interests’ -  which 
James Madison viewed as one of the virtues of a large and diverse republic -  
continue to hinder the development of large, unified factions based on religion or 
any other single attribute. Nonetheless, among the many influences on attitudes,
184 U.S. Census Bureau Report, “The Hispanic Population: Census 2000 Brief,” May 2001, p. 1.
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partisanship, and votes, religion is nearly as important as demographic factors 
such as gender, race, income, and education.”185
Achterberg has found similar results in his assessment of 20 Western 
European democracies. He concluded that traditional issues of class are just as 
relevant to voters as new cultural and environmental issues, in some instances, 
more relevant. “All in all, in the new political cultures, the old politics of class have 
come to share the stage with new issues.”186
Layman recognized this dilemma and suggested that scholars work to 
develop a new model that factors in both religious and non-religious influencers 
of voter behavior. “The model should account for the possibility that religious 
commitment and doctrinal orthodoxy have effects on political attitudes and 
partisan ties independent of religious tradition, just as the culture wars thesis 
suggests. However, it also should account for political differences between 
religious traditions and the possibility that the effects of beliefs and behaviors are 
dependent on tradition, just at the ethnoreligious viewpoint contends.”187
Further study of Catholic voting behavior is particularly important in light of 
the devastating priest sexual abuse scandal that continues to impact the church. 
For many laity, it has shaken the very foundation of their faith. In the mid-1980s, 
the first indications of widespread sexual abuse of children at the hands of the 
clergy began to surface. The church eventually paid out millions to the victims, 
but what was most unsettling to many American Catholics was the manner in
185 Kohut, Andrew, et. al., 2000, p. 124.
186 Achterberg, Peter, “Class Voting in the New Political Culture,” International Sociology, 21:2, 
2006, pp. 254.
187 Layman, p. 68.
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which the church dealt with the issue internally. Instead of taking action to ensure
clergy who had preyed on young parishioners would never commit such acts
again, the laity learned that in many cases, the church knowingly moved abuser
priests to different parishes and engaged in a massive cover-up of priest abuse.
The Northeast, one of the epicenters of American Catholics, experienced some
of the most chilling incidents, including that of defrocked priest John Geoghan,
who was believed to have molested 150 children in his 30 years in a half a dozen
parishes in the Boston Archdiocese.188 “In the ensuing national uproar, there
were admissions of dozens of molestations and cover-ups across the country,
accompanied by the suspensions or resignations of more than 200 priests,
including at least four bishops.”189
For decades, within the U.S. Catholic Church, sexual misbehavior by 
priests was shrouded in secrecy - at every level. Abusive priests — 
Geoghan among them — often instructed traumatized youngsters to say 
nothing about what had been done to them. Parents who learned of the 
abuse, often wracked by shame, guilt, and denial, tried to forget what the 
church had done. The few who complained were invariably urged to keep 
silent. And pastors and bishops, meanwhile, viewed the abuse as a sin for 
which priests could repent rather than as a compulsion they might be 
unable to control.190
Since 1950, there have been an estimated 4,983 accused priests and 
12,537 victims.191 By 2006, the total cost of the scandal to the church -  
settlements, therapy for victims, attorneys fees -  had exceeded $1.5 billion.192
188 “The Geoghan Case,” The Boston Globe, accessed online 2 May 2006, at 
http://www.boston.com/globe/spotlight/abuse/geoghan/.
189 Reichley, p. 322.
190 “Church ailowed abuse by priest for years,” The Boston Globe, accessed online 2 May 2006, 
at http://www.boston.com/globe/spotlight/abuse/stories/010602_geoghan.htm.
191 Ecksrom, Kevin, “Church Spending on Catholic Sex Abuse Scandal Tops $1 Billion," Religion 
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Many parishes still are struggling to achieve pre-scandal attendance 
levels, but some are noting signs of a rebirth of the Catholic faith and a level 
closure on the scandal. In the Boston Archdiocese, “though anger lingers, a 
strong devotion to the Gospel, Catholic liturgy and doctrinal teachings appear to 
have kept many Catholics rooted in their pews through difficult times.”193 This 
may be due, in part, to the “deep staying power” and “enduring moral authority” 
of the church; despite the scandal, many Catholics cannot imagine being 
otherwise, and appear to have “glue that Protestants do not have.”194 According 
to Davidson and Hoge, while the laity consider the priest sex-abuse scandal to 
be the number one issue facing the church and a large portion (78 percent) are 
ashamed and embarrassed for the church, overall the “majority of Catholics are 
strongly committed to their faith -  to the point that they remain loyal to the church 
even in the midst of what many consider to be the worst crisis in U.S. church 
history.”195
When Catholic immigrants first came to the New World, they thought of 
themselves as Catholic Americans -  Catholic first and American second. Over 
the course of several generations, their views of themselves evolved to thinking 
of themselves as American Catholics -  American first and Catholic second. Kapp 
explains these two conflicting beliefs as the communitarian creed and the
192 “Cost of Sexual Abuse Now Exceeds $1.5 Billion,” America, 194:15, 24 April 2006, p. 7.
193 Hovanasian, Debbie, “Catholics were tested by a sex-abuse scandal and church closings.




194 Reichley, p. 323.
195 Davidson, James D., and Hoge, Dean R., “Catholics After The Scandal,” Commonweal, 19 
November 2004, p. 15.
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individualistic creed -  one emphasizes Catholic communal teachings and the 
other moral and/or economic individualism.196 While it appears that Catholics are 
in sync with the individualistic creed and of the two creeds, consider themselves 
American Catholics, perhaps they have moved even farther away from their 
Catholic roots. Given that Catholics are trending in such similar ways as non- 
Catholics regarding who they choose for president, perhaps today’s Catholics, 
when going to the polls, think if themselves as simply Americans.
196 Kapp, pp. 123-124.
97
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abramowitz, Alan I., and Saunders, Kyle L., “Ideological Realignment in the U.S. 
Electorate,” The Journal of Politics, 60:3, August 1998, pp. 634-652
Achterberg, Peter, “Class Voting in the New Political Culture,” International 
Sociology, 21:2, 2006, pp. 237-261.
Albright, Madeleine, comments made on “The Daily Show with Jon Stewart,” 2 
May 2006.
Balmer, Randall, “Bush and God,” The Nation, 14 April 2003, pp. 7-8.
Barone, Michael, “Religion on the Left, Religion on the Right,” U.S. News and 
World Report, 21 August 2000, 129:7, p. 1, C-1.
“Belief and the ballot box,” The Economist, Vol. 371, Issue 8378, 5 June 2004.
Bendyna, Mary E., Green, John C., Rozell, Mark J., and Wilcox, Clyde, “Uneasy 
Alliance: Conservative Catholics and the Christian Right,” Sociology of Religion, 
62:1,2001, pp. 51-64.
Benestad, Brian, “The Pursuit of a Just Social Order: Policy Statements of the 
U.S. Catholic Bishops, 1966-80,” Washington, D.C., Ethics and Public Policy 
Center, 1982.
Bolce, Louis, and De Maio, Gerald, “Religious Outlook, Culture War Politics, and 
Antipathy Toward Christian Fundamentalists,” Public Opinion Quarterly, 63,
1999, pp. 29-61.
Bolzendahl, Catherine, and Brooks, Clem, “Polarization, Secularization or 
Differences as Usual? The Denominational Cleavages in U.S. Social Attitudes 
since the 1970s,” The Sociological Quarterly, 46, 2005, pp. 47-78
Breyfogle, Todd, “Some Paradoxes of Religion in the 2000 Presidential Election,” 
Stateside, 2001, pp. 543-547.
Brooks, Clem, Nieuwbeertab, Paul, and Manza, Jeff, “Cleavage-based voting 
behavior in cross-national perspective: Evidence from six postwar democracies,” 
Social Science Research, 35, 2006, pp. 88-128.
98
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Brooks, Clem, and Manza, Jeff, “A Great Divide? Religion and Political Change 
in the U.S. National Elections, 1972-2000,” The Sociological Quarterly, 45:3, 
2004, pp. 421-450.
Brooks, Clem, and Manza, Jeff, “Social Cleavages and Political Alignments: U.S. 
Presidential Elections, 1960 to 1992, American Sociological Review, 62:6, 
December 1997, pp. 937-946.
Carey, Patrick, Catholics in America, Praeger: Westport, CT, 2004.
Carroll, James, “The Bush Crusade,” The Nation, 20 September 2004, pp. 14-22.
Catechism of the Catholic Church, Washington, D.C., United States Catholic 
Conference, 1994.
“Church allowed abuse by priest for years,” The Boston Globe, accessed online 2 
May 2006, at
http://www.boston.com/globe/spotlight/abuse/stories/010602_geoghan.htm.
“Churchgoing closely tied to voting patterns,” USA Today, 3 June 2004.
“Cost of Sexual Abuse Now Exceeds $1.5 Billion,” America, 194:15, 24 April 
2006, p. 7.
Clarke, Kevin, “Wilderness Training,” U.S. Catholic, January 2005, p. 33.
Curran, Charles E., “The Pope’s Passions,” Christian Century, 120:23, 15 
November 2003, pp. 28-32.
Davidson, James D., and Hoge, Dean R., “Catholics After The Scandal,” 
Commonweal, 19 November 2004, pp. 14-19.
Democratic Party Platform of 1992, “A New Covenant with the American People,” 
Accessed online 10 March 2006 at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/showplatforms.php?platindex=D1992
Denton, Robert E. Jr., “Religion and the 2004 Presidential Campaign,” American 
Behavioral Scientist, September 2005, 49:1, pp. 11-31.
Djupe, Paul A., “Religious Brand Loyalty and Political Loyalties,” Journal for the 
Scientific Study of Religion," 2000, pp. 78-89.
Ecksrom, Kevin, “Church Spending on Catholic Sex Abuse Scandal Tops $1 





Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Feder, Don, “Gore Should have to ‘Reach Out’ Too,” Human Events, 56:29, 11 
August 2000, p. 9.
Fineman, Howard, “Rove Unleashed,” Newsweek, 144:23, 6 December 2004.
Gorsuch, Richard L., “Psychology of Religion,” Annual Review of Psychology, 38, 
1988, pp. 201-221.
Green, John C., “The American Religious Landscape and Political Attitudes: A 
Baseline for 2004,” The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, based on the 
Fourth National Survey of Religion and Politics, Bliss Institute, University of 
Akron, March-May, 2004, pp. 1-57.
Green, John C., “The Christian Right and the 1994 Elections, PS: Political 
Science and Politics, 28:1, March 1995, pp. 5-8.
Green, John, C., Smidt, Corwin E., Guth, James L., and Kellstedt, Lyman A.,
“The American Religious Landscape and the 2004 Presidential Vote: Increased 
Polarization,” The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, 3 February 2005, pp. 
1-18.
Green, John, C., and Guth, James L, “From Lambs to Sheep: Denominational 
Change and Political Behavior,” in Rediscovering the Religious Factor in 
American Politics, pp. 100-117, ed. David C. Leege and Lyman A. Kellstedt, M.E 
Sharpe: New York, 1993.
Guth, James L., and Green, John C. “Politics in a New Key: Religiosity and 
Participation among Political Activists,” The Western Political Quarterly, 43:1, 
March 1990, pp. 153-179.
Guth, James L., and Green, John, C., “Salience: The Core Concept?,” in 
Rediscovering the Religious Factor in American Politics, p. 157-174, ed. David C. 
Leege and Lyman A. Kellstedt, M.E Sharpe: New York, 1993.
Guth, James L., and Green, John C., The Bible and the Ballot Box, 1991,
Boulder, CO: Westview.
Guth, James L., Kellstedt, Lyman A., Green, John C., Smidt, Corwin E., “America 
Fifty/Fifty,” First Things: A Monthly Journal of Religion and Public Life, Issue 116, 
October 2001, pp. 19-26.
Green, John, Kellstedt, Lyman, Guth, James, and Smidt, Corwin, “Who Elected 
Clinton: A Collision of Values,” First Things, 75, August/September 1997, pp. 35- 
40. Accessed online 12 March 2006 at 
http://www.firstthings.com/ftissues/ft9708/clinton.html.
100
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Himmelfarb, Gertrude, “Religion in the 2000 Election,” Public Interest, Issue 143, 
Spring 2001, pp. 20-26.
Hout, Michael, and Fischer, Claude S., “Why More Americans Have No Religious 
Preference: Politics and Generations,” American Sociological Review, 67, April 
2002, pp. 165-190.
Hout, Michael, and Fischer, Claude S., “O Be Some Other Name,” American 
Sociological Review, 68:2, April 2003, pp. 316-318.
Hovanasian, Debbie, “Catholics were tested by a sex-abuse scandal and church 
closings. Now the faithful are seeing signs of renewal,” Lowell Sun, 16 April 
2006, accessed online via LexisNexis at http://web.lexis- 
nexis.com/universe/document?_m=0a8df18a3442688bb3391d882a3e1028&_do 
cnum=6&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkVA&_md5=97c12aced14f4e2765ac796d6d05efe8.
Johnson, Jenny, “The Minister Of'Good Success',” Christianity Today, 45:12, 1 
October 2001, pp. 60-65.
Kapp, Lawrence, “The Political Values and Voting Behavior of American 
Catholics: Changes and Continuities from 1984 to 1998,” Ph.D. Dissertation, 
Catholic University, 1999.
Kellstedt, Lyman A., Green, John C., Guth, James L., and Smidt, Corwin, E., “It’s 
the Culture Stupid! 1992 and Our Political Future,” First Things, 42, April 1994, 
pp. 28-33.
Kellstedt, Lyman A., Green, John C., Guth, James L., and Smidt, Corwin E., 
“Religious Voting Blocs in the 1992 Election: the year of the Evangelical?”, 
Sociology of Religion, 55:3,1994, pp. 307-326.
Kellstedt, Lyman A., and Green, John C., “Knowing God’s Many People: 
Denominational Preference and Political Behavior,” in Rediscovering the 
Religious Factor in American Politics, p. 53-71, ed. David C. Leege and Lyman 
A. Kellstedt, M.E Sharpe: New York, 1993.
Kellstedt, Lyman A., and Smidt, Corwin E., “Doctrinal Beliefs and Political 
Behavior: Views of the Bible,” in Rediscovering the Religious Factor in American 
Politics, p. 177-196, ed. David C. Leege and Lyman A. Kellstedt, M.E Sharpe: 
New York, 1993.
Kohut, Andrew, Green, John C., Keeter, Scott, and Toth, Robert C., The 
Diminishing Divide: Religion’s Changing Role in American Politics, The 
Brookings Institution: Washington, D.C., 2000.
101
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Langan, John, “Observations on Abortion and Politics,” America, 191:12, 25 
October 2005.
Langer, Gary, and Cohen, Jon, “Voters and Values in the 2004 Election,” Public 
Opinion Quarterly, 69:5, Special Issue 2005, pp. 744-759.
Layman, Geoffrey C., The Great Divide: Religious and Cultural Conflict in 
American Party Politics, ed. Robert Y. Shapiro, Columbia University Press: New 
York, 2001.
Layman, Geoffrey C., “Religion and Political Behavior in the United States: The 
Impact of Beliefs, Affiliations, and Commitment From 1980 to 1994,” Public 
Opinion Quarterly, 61, 1997, p. 288-316.
Layman, Geoffrey C., and Carmines, Edward G., “Cultural Conflict in American 
Politics: Religious Traditionalism, Postmaterialism, and U.S. Political Behavior,” 
The Journal of Politics, 59:3, August 1997, pp. 751-777.
Leege, David C., “Religion and Politics in Theoretical Perspective,” in 
Rediscovering the Religious Factor in American Politics, pp. 3-25, ed. David C. 
Leege and Lyman A. Kellstedt, M.E Sharpe: New York, 1993.
“Man of the Year,” Time Magazine, 25 December 1995.
Manza, Jeff, and Brooks, Clem, “The Religious Factor in U.S. Elections, 1960- 
1992,” The American Journal of Sociology, 103:1, July 1997, pp. 38-81.
Martin, William, With God on Our Side: The Rise of the Religious Right in 
America, Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group: New York, 1996.
Mayer, William G., “The Swing Voter In American Presidential Elections: An 
Initial Inquiry,” 2006, p. 30-31. Presented June 10, 2006, at the Northeastern 
University conference, “The Swing Voter in American Politics,” Boston, Mass.
Meishenhelder, Janice Bell, and Marcum, John, “Responses of Clergy to 9/11: 
Posttraumatic Stress, Coping, and Religious Outcomes,” Scientific Study of 
Religion, 43:4 (2004), pp. 547-554.
Morton, Heather, ed., “Religion and Public Life: A Faith-Based Partisan Divide,” 
The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, Trends 2005, pp. 24-39.
National Bureau of Economic Research, http://www.nber.org/cvcles/. accessed 
31 May 2006.
O’Beirne, Kate, “Catholics For Bush,” National Review, 29 November 2004, pp.
24-26.
102
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
"On Church and State: Remarks of John F. Kennedy Addressed to the Greater 
Houston Ministerial Association," 363-76, in The Kennedy Reader, ed. Jay David, 
The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., Indianapolis, Indiana, 1967, p. 366.
Page, Susan, “Reagan's revolution reshaped political landscape,” USA Today, 7 
June 2004, p. 18a.
Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life event transcript, “How the Faithful Voted: 
Political Alignments & the Religious Divide in Election 2004,” 17 November 2004. 
Accessed 28 January 2006, http://pewforum.orq/events/index.php?EventlD=64.
Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, “Abortion and Rights of Terror Suspects 
Top Court Issues,” 3 August 2005, pp. 1-29.
Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, “Religion a Strength and 
Weakness for Both Parties,” 30 August 2005, pp. 1-45.
Pierard, Richard V., “Religion and the 1984 Election Campaign,” Review of 
Religious Research, 27:2, December 1985, pp. 98-114.
Prendergast, William B., The Catholic Voter in America, Georgetown University 
Press, Washington, D.C., 1999.
Putnam, Robert, “Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital,” Journal of 
Democracy, 6:1, January 1995, pp. 65-78.
Republican Party Platform of 1992, The Vision Shared: The Republican 
Platform, Uniting Our Family, Our Country, Our World,” 17 August 1992. 
Accessed online 10 March 2006 at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/showplatforms.php
Reichley, A. James, Faith in Politics, Brookings Institution Press: Washington, 
D.C., 2002.
“Religion And Politics: Contention And Consensus,” the Pew Research Center for 
the People and the Press, and the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, 24 
July 2003.
“Religious Beliefs Underpin Opposition To Homosexuality,” the Pew Research 
Center for the People and the Press, and the Pew Forum on Religion and Public 
Life, 18 November 2003.
Republican Contract With America, 1994. Accessed online 21 February 2006, 
http://www.house.gov/house/Contract/CONTRACT.html.
103
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Sabato, Larry J., Divided States of America: The Slash and Bum Politics of the 
2004 Presidential Election, Pearson Longman, 2006, p. 224.
Schneider, William, “American Religion and Political Polarities,” American 
Sociologist, 34: 1/2, Spring/Summer 2003, pp. 81-84.
Schifferes, Steve, “Bill Clinton's economic legacy,” BBC, 15 January 2001, 
accessed online 31 May 2006 at 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/1/hi/business/1110165.stm.
Shaw, Daron, “Swing Voting and U.S. Presidential Elections,” 2006, p. 23. 
Presented June 10, 2006, at the Northeastern University conference, “The Swing 
Voter in American Politics,” Boston, Mass.
Stam, Juan, “Bush’s Religious Language,” The Nation, 22 December 2003, p. 27.
Stone, Andrea, “Gay marriage looms large for ’04.” USA Today, 19 November
2003.
“The Geoghan Case,” The Boston Globe, access online 2 May 2006, at 
http://www.boston.com/globe/spotlight/
U.S. Census Bureau Report, “The Hispanic Population: Census 2000 Brief,” May
2001, pp. 1-8.
“Voters pass all 11 bans on gay marriage,” The Associated Press, 3 November
2004. Accessed online at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6383353/.
Walczak, Lee, Gleckman, Howard. Miller, Rich. Dunham, Richard S.,
Magnusson, Paul, “The Next Four Years,” Business Week, Issue 3908, 15 
November 2004.
Wald, Kenneth D., Religion and Politics in the United States, Rowman and 
Littlefield Publishers, Oxford, England, 2003.
Wald, Kenneth D., and Smidt, Corwin E., “Measurement Strategies in the Study 
of Religion and Politics,” in Rediscovering the Religious Factor in American 
Politics, p. 26-49, ed. David C. Leege and Lyman A. Kellstedt, M.E Sharpe: New 
York, 1993.
Walker, Martin, “The U.S. Presidential Election, 1996,” International Affairs, 72:4, 
October 1996, p. 657-674.
Weakliem, David L., “Race versus Class? Racial Composition and Class Voting, 
1936-1992,” Social Forces, 75:3, March 1997, pp. 939-956.
104
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Welch, Michael R., Leege, David C., Wald, Kenneth D., and Kellstedt, Lyman A., 
“Are the Sheep Hearing the Shepherds? Cue Perceptions, Congregational 
Responses and Political Communication Processes,” in Rediscovering the 
Religious Factor in American Politics, pp. 235-254, ed. David C. Leege and 
Lyman A. Kellstedt, M.E Sharpe: New York, 1993, p. 248-249.
Woodberry, Robert D., and Smith, Christian S., “Fundamentalism Et Al: 
Conservative Protestants in America,” Annual Review of Sociology, 24, 1998, pp.
25-56.
Wuthnow, Robert, “Mobilizing Civic Engagement: The Changing Impact of 
Religious Involvement,” in Civic Engagement in American Democracy, ed. Theda 
Skocpol and Morris P. Fiorina, pp. 331-363. Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
Institution and Russell Sage Foundation, 1999.
105
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
